A More Robust Definition of Multiple Priors by Ghirardato, Paolo & Marciano, Siniscalchi
Amore robust definition of multiple priors
Paolo Ghirardato
Marciano Siniscalchi
No. 144
April 2010
www.carloalberto.org/working_papers
© 2010 by Paolo Ghirardato and Marciano Siniscalchi. Any opinions expressed here are those of theauthors and not those of the Collegio Carlo Alberto.
A more robust definition of multiple priors
Paolo Ghirardato∗ Marciano Siniscalchi†
April 21, 2010
Abstract
This paper provides a multiple-priors representation of ambiguous beliefs à la Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) and Nehring (2002) for any preference that is (i) mono-
tonic, (ii) Bernoullian, i.e. admits an affine utility representation when restricted to con-
stant acts, and (iii) suitably continuous. Monotonicity is the main substantive assumption:
we do not require either Certainty Independence or Uncertainty Aversion. We characterize
the set of ambiguous beliefs in terms of Clarke-Rockafellar differentials. This allows us to
provide an explicit calculation of the set of priors for several recent decision models: mul-
tiplier preferences, the smooth ambiguity model, the vector expected utility model, as well
as confidence function, variational, general “uncertainty-averse” preferences, and mean-
dispersion preferences.
1 Introduction
Sets of probabilities, and the related notions of “upper and lower probabilities” employed by
statisticians (Smith, 1961; Dempster, 1967), have long been a key ingredient of intuitions about
ambiguity. For example, to rationalize the modal choices in his now-famous examples, Ellsberg
(1961, p. 61) suggested that the thought process of his subjects may have unfolded as follows:
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[o]ut of the set Y of all possible distributions there remains a set Y 0 of distributions
that still seem ‘reasonable,’ . . . that his information — perceived as scanty, unreli-
able, ambiguous — does not permit him confidently to rule out.”
Similar sentiments are echoed, for instance, by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, p. 142) in their
seminal contribution. More recently, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, p. 1850) focus on
“behavior in instances where the DM’s information is explicitly consistent with multiple prob-
abilities on the state space relevant to the decision at hand.” The theory of “model uncertainty”
proposed by Lars Hansen, Thomas Sargent and their coauthors has a very similar intuitive mo-
tivation: “[t]he decision maker believes that data will come from an unknown member of a set
of unspecified models near his approximating model.” (Hansen and Sargent, 2008, p. 5).
At the same time, sets of probabilities, or “multiple priors,” also play a prominent formal
role in several popular models of choice in the face of ambiguity. For instance, according to the
maxmin-expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the individual eval-
uates an uncertain prospect (“act”) h, mapping states in a set S to outcomes in a set X , ac-
cording to their minimum expected utility over a weak∗-closed, convex set D of probabilities:
formally, V (h) =minQ∈D EQ[u ◦ h]. In the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent (2001), the
evaluating functional is instead V (h) =minQ∈∆(S)EQ[u ◦h] + θR(Q‖P), where ∆(S) is the set of
all measures on S (endowed with a suitable sigma-algebra), θ ≥ 0 is a parameter, and R de-
notes the relative entropy of Q with respect to the “approximating model” P . In the smooth-
ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005), the evaluating functional is a double expectation:
V (h) =
∫
∆(S)
φ
 
EQ[u ◦h] dµ(Q), where φ and µ are the “second-order” utility function and
probability measure respectively. Other examples will be provided in due course.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a general, preference-based link between the in-
tuitive interpretation of multiple priors described in the first paragraph above, and their formal
role indicated in the second paragraph. To this end, we adopt a formal definition of relevant pri-
ors, which relates the above intuitive interpretation to preferences, and identifies a unique set
of probabilities under mild regularity conditions. The main result of this paper then shows that
the definition we adopt is operational; specifically, we provide a general “differential” charac-
terization, which we then specialize to compute relevant priors for virtually all models of choice
under ambiguity, including the most recent ones. These results indicate that the notion of rele-
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vant priors is robust, in the sense that it reflects the intended interpretation for a broad class of
preferences that display a wide spectrum of attitudes toward ambiguity.
Our motivation is both methodological and practical. Methodologically, our results provide
a robust subjective foundation of the notion of “multiple priors,” analogous to Machina and
Schmeidler (1992)’s foundation of “single-prior” non-expected utility decision making. From
a practical point of view, applications of ambiguity-sensitive decision models typically rely on
substantive assumptions about agents’ beliefs and their perception of ambiguity. These as-
sumptions are typically formalized by adopting a specific functional representation of prefer-
ences, and imposing suitable restrictions on its parameters. Furthermore, it is both common
and natural to explore comparative statics with respect to variations in these parameters. Our
results provide a rigorous interpretation to such assumptions and comparative-statics exer-
cises. This is all the more important in light of the fact that the connection between parameters
and relevant priors is not always obvious; we provide an example based on a popular specifica-
tion of smooth-ambiguity preferences in §6.2.2 (for another example, see Siniscalchi 2006).
Our “robust” derivation of ambiguous beliefs also has potential direct applications to in-
formation economics. For instance, sets of priors representing ambiguous beliefs play a cru-
cial role in several recent results on the absence of trade and efficient risk-sharing (e.g. Billot,
Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon, 2000). These results are obtained under the assumption of
Ambiguity Hedging (see below), so a question arises as to their robustness to less extreme as-
sumptions on ambiguity attitudes. Our findings may provide the tools to investigate this and
other issues of economic significance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a heuristic discussion of our results.
Section 3 discusses the related literature, with special emphasis on the work of Ghirardato et al.
(2004, GMM henceforth) and Nehring (2002, 2007). Section 4 introduces notation and other
preliminaries. Section 5 describes the preference axioms we adopt and provides a functional
representation of preferences. Section 6 provides the main results: it defines relevant priors,
states our differential characterization, and then calculates relevant priors for a variety of deci-
sion models. Section 7 discusses crisp acts and unambiguous events for MBC preferences. All
proof are in the Appendix.
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2 Heuristic treatment
Relevant priors
The notion of relevant priors that we adopt is essentially due to GMM and Nehring (2002);
in particular, our definition is a slight variant of Nehring’s notion of “Bernoulli priors” (see
Nehring, 2002, p.27). For brevity, we henceforth refer to these contributions as GMM/N. Sup-
pose that the individual’s preferences over the (convex) set X of consequences are represented
by a Bernoulli utility function u ; notice that this is the case for all the models we discussed
above. We deem a weak∗-closed, convex set D of probabilities, or priors, over a state space S
relevant if the following two conditions hold:
(i) For every pair of acts f and g , if EQ[u ◦ f ]≥ EQ[u ◦ g ] for all probabilities Q ∈D, then f is
weakly preferred to g ; and
(ii) for every weak∗-closed, convex, proper subset set D ′ of D, there exist acts f and g such
that EQ[u ◦ f ]≥ EQ[u ◦ g ] for all probabilities Q ∈D ′, but g is strictly preferred to f .
To interpret, note first that, for a fixed Bernoulli utility u , we can identify probabilities in the
candidate set D with alternative expected-utility decision models that the individual deems sen-
sible.1 If every such sensible model ranks f above g , the individual should arguably prefer f to
g : this is precisely what Condition (i) requires.
A moment’s reflection shows that this requirement is too weak in and of itself: any “suffi-
ciently large” set of priors (for instance, the set ∆(S) of all priors) satisfies it. We then require
that, loosely speaking, the entire candidate set of priors should “matter”: if only some of the
expected-utility models the individual deems sensible rank one act above another, the individ-
ual’s preferences could still rank them the opposite way. Condition (ii) embodies this require-
ment: more precisely, it asserts that, for any proper (weak∗-closed, convex) subset D ′ of the
1This is consistent with the way probabilities are treated in all the functional specifications discussed above (e.g.
MEU), and indeed with most models of ambiguity-sensitive preferences in the literature. However, one advantage
of our approach is that it is “modular”: although we do not do so here, one could allow for a more general definition,
where expected utility is replaced by another preference functional over lotteries.
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candidate set D, we can find acts that are ranked one way by priors in D ′, and the opposite way
by the individual.
We suggest that the definition of relevant priors captures the spirit of the quotations re-
produced above. The question arises whether a set of relevant priors exists for a given prefer-
ence relation, and whether, if one exists, it is unique. Our first, preliminary result, contained in
Propositions 3 and 4, delivers existence and uniqueness of relevant priors for a broad class of
preferences, discussed below. Furthermore, it does so by drawing a tight connection with the
work of GMM/N; we discuss this in more detail in Sec. 3.
Our second and main contribution is to make this definition of relevant priors operational.
Except in trivial or very special cases, Conditions (i) and (ii) are cumbersome to verify directly.
Our Theorem 5 provides a solution. The preferences we consider (details will be provided mo-
mentarily) admit a representation via a pair (I , u ), where u is a Bernoulli utility function and I is
a suitable functional over bounded, measurable real functions: an act f is preferred to another
act g if and only if I (u ◦ f )≥ I (u ◦ g ). Theorem 5 states that for such preferences the set of rele-
vant priors is, up to convex closure, the union of all normalized Clarke-Rockafellar differentials
of I (Rockafellar, 1979), evaluated at all points in the interior of its domain.
We then leverage this general result to explicitly compute the set of relevant priors for a va-
riety of recent decision models: we consider multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent, 2001)
in §6.2.1; the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) in §6.2.2; the vector expected
utility model (Siniscalchi, 2009) in §6.2.3; confidence function (Chateauneuf and Faro, 2006),
variational (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), and general “uncertainty-averse”
preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio, 2008) in §6.2.5; and
monotone mean-dispersion preferences (Grant and Polak, 2007) in §6.2.4. These calculations
showcase properties of the Clarke-Rockafellar differential, and provide guidance for further ap-
plications to other models. Substantively, calculating relevant priors for these more sophisti-
cated decision models can provide new insight into their properties and distinguishing features.
Our calculations also provide further validation for the GMM/N approach we generalize.
5
Robustness: MBC preferences
To ensure that our identification of relevant priors be robust, our results impose minimal reg-
ularity conditions on preferences. Specifically, we allow for any preference relation that is (i)
monotonic, (ii) Bernoullian, i.e. admits an expected utility representation when restricted to
constant acts, and (iii) suitably continuous. We refer to such preferences as “MBC” for short.
Again, all of our initial examples, as well as virtually all preference specifications employed in
applications, are members of the MBC class.
Our preference assumptions do not restrict ambiguity attitudes in any way. To elaborate, as is
well-known, MEU preferences embody a specific, strong form of aversion to ambiguity, which
we call Ambiguity Hedging.2 The same axiom appears in the characterization of variational
preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006), of which multiplier preferences are a special case; for a
general analysis of “uncertainty-averse preferences,” see Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008). Smooth-
ambiguity preferences featuring a concave second-order utility function display a (stronger)
form of Ambiguity Hedging.
Ambiguity Hedging is a mathematically convenient assumption, naturally related to con-
vexity in the realms of traditional consumer and firm theory. However, beginning with Epstein
(1999), concerns have been voiced regarding the extent to which it satisfactorily formalizes the
behavioral phenomenon of aversion to ambiguity; alternatives have been proposed (Epstein,
1999; Chateauneuf and Tallon, 2002, and GMM). More recently, Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido
(2008) employ two intriguing examples due to Machina (2009) to show that (i) decision mod-
els that incorporate the Ambiguity Hedging axiom, as well as smooth-ambiguity preferences
with a concave second-order utility, preclude intuitive patterns of behavior that are clearly in-
dicative of dislike for ambiguity; and (ii) such patterns are actually observed in experimental
settings. Furthermore, Ambiguity Hedging and related axioms impose a uniform dislike for
ambiguity: loosely speaking, they require that, for instance, the individual avoid bets on any
event she perceives as being ambiguous. By way of contrast, several influential contributions
have demonstrated experimentally that the same individual may exhibit different ambiguity at-
2Following Schmeidler (1989), this is usually named “Uncertainty Aversion.” See Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002) for an explanation of our choice of terminology.
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titudes, depending upon the choice problem she faces (see, e.g., Heath and Tversky, 1991), the
stakes involved (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990), etc.
Again with an eye toward robustness, we do not impose any form of “independence” on non-
constant acts. To elaborate, the classical Anscombe and Aumann (1963) Independence axiom
requires that the preference ranking between two acts f and g be preserved under (state-wise)
mixtures with any third act h. MEU preferences satisfy (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) a re-
laxed form of this axiom, called Certainty Independence, which only requires that preferences
be preserved under mixtures with constant acts. This assumption is mathematically conve-
nient, as we illustrate below in our discussion of the results in GMM. However, Certainty Inde-
pendence also significantly restricts ambiguity attitudes: for instance, a linear-utility decision
maker who satisfies this axiom displays the same attitudes toward ambiguity regardless of her
initial wealth, as well as the magnitude of the payoffs.3 Recent theoretical contributions by
Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Grant and Polak (2007) underscore the importance of relaxing or re-
moving these restrictions; this is also in accordance with economic intuition in risk settings.
For these reasons, MBC preferences do not engender any form of “ambiguity aversion” or
weak independence. Our only substantive behavioral assumption on preferences over non-
constant acts is Monotonicity. Thus, we rule out “arbitrage opportunities,” “Dutch books” or
“money pumps”—all phenomena that are also typically avoided in applications.
3 Related literature
As noted above, our definition of relevant priors builds upon ideas in GMM/N.4 Nehring (2002)
(see also Nehring, 2007) deems an individual “utility sophisticated” with respect to some set D
of priors if her preferences satisfy Condition (i) above; he calls D the set of “Bernoulli priors”
if it is the minimal set (with respect to set inclusion) for which this is the case. Nehring ar-
gues that, under the behavioral assumptions considered by GMM, the set C of priors that GMM
identify (see below) is the set of Bernoulli priors. Formally, our Condition (ii) makes Nehring’s
minimality requirement a bit more explicit.
3In the case of non-neutral risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes are independent of initial utility, etc.
4For the precise connection between the work of GMM and Nehring, see GMM and Nehring (2002).
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The interpretation and use of relevant priors in the papers just cited is slightly different from
ours. Nehring (2002) suggests that every DM comes equipped with two primitive binary rela-
tions: her preferences over acts, and an incomplete likelihood ordering over events. This like-
lihood relation and its compatibility with the DM’s act preferences, are the focus of Nehring
(2002). Under a non-atomicity condition (which we do not require), the likelihood ordering ad-
mits a Bewley-style representation, via a convex-ranged setΠ of priors. The notion of “Bernoulli
priors” is then mainly intended as a way to relate what is behaviorally identified (GMM’s set C )
and the DM’s “true” beliefs (the set Π): cf. Theorem 3 in Nehring (2002). Nehring (2007) instead
emphasizes utility sophistication as a property of independent interest.
We do not distinguish between a “true but unobservable” set of priors and the relevant pri-
ors we identify from behavior. Our objective is to identify the collection of alternative models
of the world that have behavioral, rather than epistemic significance. Moreover, our main con-
tribution is the differential characterization of relevant priors, which Nehring does not provide.
The paper closest to ours is GMM. This influential contribution associates with a given
primitive preference over acts an unambiguous preference relation, which admits a representa-
tion à la Bewley, via a set C of priors. The analysis in GMM is carried out under the assumption
that the primitive preference satisfies Certainty Independence; our Proposition 3 shows that
their construction extends to our environment. More importantly, our Proposition 4 shows
that the set C that provides a Bewley representation of unambiguous preferences is, in fact, the
unique set of relevant priors for any primitive MBC preference relation.
We prefer our notion of relevant priors because (i) it is stated in terms of the individual’s
primitive preference relation, rather than the unambiguous preference ordering; and (ii) it is
explicitly motivated by the interpretation of priors as alternative models that the individual
considers possible.
GMM also provide a “differential” characterization of the set C as the Clarke differential
(Clarke, 1983) of the representing functional I (see above), evaluated at the origin. They then
use this characterization to compute relevant priors for models that fit their assumptions, in-
cluding subjective expected utility, MEU, CEU, and more. These calculations suggest that the
notion of relevant priors coincides with the “consensus” intuition about probabilistic beliefs,
and hence validate the approach proposed by GMM. Since our definition of relevant priors is
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essentially theirs, we are confident that the results of our own calculations for more recent,
richer decision models capture important elements of the DM’s perception of ambiguity, and
can enhance our understanding thereof.
That said, it is important to emphasize that the analytical tools we use to establish our main
differential characterization result are different from GMM’s. The main reason is that, under
Certainty Independence, the Clarke derivative and differential of I enjoy especially convenient
properties that are not satisfied in our environment (see the discussion following Def. 3). Our
main result, Theorem 5, provides a differential characterization for all MBC preferences without
relying on these properties. We obtain the GMM result as a special case in Corollary 8, and also
consider partial weakenings of Certainty Independence—see Corollaries 6 and 7.
Other related literature
Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (forthcoming) consider a DM who is endowed
with two binary relations over acts. One reflects “objective” information, and may be incom-
plete; the other is complete, and reflects the DM’s actual behavior. These preferences are re-
lated via two consistency requirement. The first, “Consistency,” states that, if f is objectively
superior to g , then it should also be behaviorally preferred. The second, “Caution,” essentially
states that the DM takes a “pessimistic,” or “worst-case scenario” attitude in order to decide
when objective information is insufficient. Certainty Independence is assumed.
The objective preference has a Bewley-style representation; under the first consistency con-
dition, the corresponding set of priors is a subset of the collection of relevant priors for the
behavioral preference. But, if both consistency requirements are imposed, the behavioral pref-
erence is MEU, and the two sets of priors coincide.
While there are natural similarities, our objectives are clearly different. We do not posit the
existence of objective information, and, as noted above, do not restrict ambiguity attitudes.
Again, our main contribution is the operational characterization of relevant priors.
Finally, Siniscalchi (2006) proposes a related notion of “plausible priors.” Loosely speaking,
a prior is deemed plausible if it is the unique probability that provides an expected-utility repre-
sentation of the individual’s preferences over a subset of acts. The cited paper provides axioms
(which include Certainty Independence) under which plausible priors exist.
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The main difference with the present paper, and with the GMM/N approach, is the fact
that plausible priors are identified individually, rather than as elements of a set. This requires
restrictions on preferences that we do not need (in addition to Certainty Independence).
4 Notation and preliminaries
We consider a state space S, endowed with a sigma-algebra Σ. The notation B0(Σ,Γ) indicates
the set of simple Σ–measurable real functions on S with values in the interval5 Γ⊂R, endowed
with the topology induced by the supremum norm; for simplicity, write B0(Σ,R) as B0(Σ).
Similarly, we denote by Bb (Σ,Γ) the set of Σ–measurable real functions a : S→ R for which
there exist α,β ∈ Γ such that α ≥ a (s ) ≥ β for all s ∈ S; note that, since Γ is assumed to be
an interval, a (s ) ∈ Γ for all s ∈ S. We equip the set Bb (Σ,Γ) with the supremum norm, and let
B (Σ) ≡ Bb (Σ,R). Recall that, since Σ is a sigma-algebra, B (Σ) is the closure of B0(Σ), and it is a
Banach space.
The set of finitely additive probabilities onΣ is denoted ba1(Σ). The (relative) weak∗ topology
on ba1(Σ) is the topology induced by B0(Σ) or, equivalently, by B (Σ).
If B is one of the spaces B0(Σ,Γ) or Bb (Σ,Γ) for some interval Γ, a functional I : B → R is:
monotonic if I (a ) ≥ I (b ) for all a ≥ b ; continuous if it is sup-norm continuous; normalized
if I (α1S) = α for all α ∈ Γ; isotone if, for all α,β ∈ Γ, I (α1S) ≥ I (β 1S) if and only if α ≥ β ;
translation-invariant if I (a +α1S) = I (a )+α for all a ∈ B and α∈R such that a +α1S ∈ B ; pos-
itively homogeneous if I (αa ) = αI (a ) for all a ∈ B and α ∈R+ such that αa ∈ B ; and constant-
linear if it is translation-invariant and positively homogeneous.
Finally, fix a convex subset X of a vector space. (Simple) acts are Σ-measurable functions
f : S→ X such that f (S) = { f (s ) : s ∈ S} is finite; the set of all (simple) acts is denoted byF . We
define mixtures of acts pointwise: for anyα∈ [0, 1], α f +(1−α)g is the act that delivers the prize
α f (s )+ (1−α)g (s ) in state s . Given f , g ∈F and A ∈ Σ, we denote by f A g the act inF which
yields f (s ) for s ∈ A and g (s ) for s ∈ Ac ≡S \A.
5By interval, we mean a convex subset of the real line, which may be open or closed on the left or right, and may
also be unbounded on one or both sides.
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5 MBC preferences
5.1 Axioms
The main object of interest is a preference relation ¼ onF . The first axiom is standard.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) ¼ is complete and transitive onF .
The next two axioms, which employ the convex structure of X , are familiar from expected
utility. As usual, (resp. ∼) denotes the asymmetric (resp. symmetric) component of¼, and we
abuse notation by identifying the prize x with the constant act that delivers x for every s .
Axiom 2 (Constant Independence) ∀x , y , z ∈ X , ∀λ ∈ (0, 1]: x  y implies λx + (1−λ)z  λy +
(1−λ)z .
Axiom 3 (Constant Archimedean) ∀x , y ∈ X and f ∈F : if x  f  y then there are α,β ∈ (0, 1)
such that αx +(1−α)y  f βx +(1−β )y .
As it is well-known, the above three axioms (restricted to X ) imply the existence of a Bernoulli
utility index on X ; that is, u : X →Rwhich is affine and represents the restriction of¼ to X . Thus,
they embody what we called the Bernoullian structure of our preference. Furthermore,these ax-
ioms also imply the existence of certainty equivalents for all acts f ∈F .
The next axiom is key, and it applies to all ofF .
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity) ∀ f , g ∈F : if f (s )¼ g (s ) for all s ∈S then f ¼ g .
A first departure from GMM in required at this point. Alongside Monotonicity, the Certainty
Independence axiom implies that preferences are “uniformly continuous.”6 Since we drop Cer-
tainty Independence, here we explicitly assume a form of continuity.
Furthermore, functional representations of preferences via uniformly continuous function-
als defined on some subset B0 of B0(Σ) can be extended by standard arguments to representa-
tions on the closure of B0 in B (Σ), with non-empty interior. This is important for our purposes,
because the techniques we use apply to functionals defined on Banach, rather than normed
6Analogously, Maccheroni et al. (2006) obtain uniform continuity as a consequence of Monotonicity and Weak
Certainty Independence (Axiom 9 below).
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spaces. Norm continuity alone is not sufficient to ensure the existence of such an extension,
and uniform continuity is more than is actually needed. Instead, we propose an axiom that is
both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a suitable, unique continuous extension. Our
axiom, Cauchy Continuity, adapts a well-known condition (Bourbaki, 1998, §8.5, Theorem 1) to
the present decision-theoretic setting; Observation 1, preceding the proof of Proposition 1 in
the Appendix, provides additional discussion, and motivates the name of our axiom.
We require some notation. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), letFb denote the col-
lection of functions f : S→X that satisfy the following two properties:
(i) for all x ∈X , {s ∈S : f (s ) x } ∈Σ; and
(ii) there exist x , y ∈X such that x ¼ f (s )¼ y for all s ∈S.
Informally, Fb is the set of acts that are both measurable and bounded with respect to the re-
striction of the preference ¼ to X .
Now fix a sequence of acts ( f k )⊂F and an act f ∈Fb . Say that ( f k ) converges to f , written
f k → f , iff, for all prizes x , y ∈X with x  y , there exists K such that k ≥ K implies for all s ∈S
1
2
f (s )+
1
2
y ≺ 1
2
f k (s )+
1
2
x and
1
2
f k (s )+
1
2
y ≺ 1
2
f (s )+
1
2
x .
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that this definition corresponds to sup-norm convergence in
the space of utility profiles. Note that, like the definition of Fb , a statement such as f k → f
involves preferences over X exclusively.
We can now state our continuity assumption.
Axiom 5 (Cauchy Continuity) Consider sequences ( f k ) ⊂ F , (x k ) ⊂ X such that f k → f ∈ Fb .
If f k ∼ x k for all k , then there exists x ∈X such that x k → x .
Three observations are in order. First of all, Axiom 5 only involves preferences over sim-
ple acts in F ; after all, that is the domain of the preference relation ¼ we assume given. To
elaborate, the assumption f k → f concerns preferences over X , even if f is not a simple act;
furthermore, each act f k is simple, so f k ∼ x k is a well-defined statement about preferences
over F . In particular, the axiom does not require that “ f ∼ x ”: indeed, at this stage such a
statement would be meaningless in case f 6∈ F , because ¼ is not defined onFb .
Second, if the limit act f is, in fact, simple, then the proof of Proposition 1 below shows that
in this case f ∼ x must follow. Furthermore, the same result implies that it is possible to extend
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¼ from F to Fb uniquely, and in this case the extended preference relation will necessarily
deem f and x indifferent.
Finally, Proposition 1 also implies that, if the DM were to have suitably continuous prefer-
ences over all ofFb , then the restriction of her preferences toF would satisfy Axiom 5. In other
words, Cauchy Continuity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a continuous extension
of preferences fromF toFb .
Our final axiom is standard.
Axiom 6 (Non-triviality) There exist x , y ∈X such that x  y .
5.2 Basic functional representation
Proposition 1 A preference relation ¼ satisfies Axioms 1–6 if and only if there exists a non-
constant, affine function u : X → R and a monotonic, normalized, continuous functional I :
Bb (Σ, u (X ))→R such that for all f , g ∈F
f ¼ g ⇐⇒ I (u ◦ f )≥ I (u ◦ g ). (1)
Moreover, if (Iv , v ) also satisfies Eq. (1), and Iv is normalized, then there exist λ,µ∈Rwith λ> 0
such that v (x ) =λu (x )+µ for all x ∈X , and Iv (b ) =λI (λ−1[b −µ])+µ for all b ∈ Bb (Σ, v (X )).
We emphasize that Proposition 1 establishes the equivalence between axioms on a prefer-
ence relation ¼ on simple acts, and the existence of a monotonic, normalized and continuous
functional I on a set of bounded functions. This allows for a succinct statement of the result
that involves standard properties of functionals, such as continuity; we could of course provide
an (equivalent) characterization in terms of the restriction of I to B0(Σ, u (X )), but this would
require adding to continuity a functional counterpart (Cauchy continuity) to Axiom 5. As noted
above, our analysis requires a functional defined on a suitable subset of the Banach space B (Σ),
which is why we chose to employ the current formulation.
Notice that differently from Lemma 1 in GMM, the functional I depends upon the normal-
ization chosen for the utility function; the pair (I , u ) is unique.
Henceforth, in light of Proposition 1, a binary relation ¼ onF that satisfies Axioms 1–6 will
be called an MBC preference (for Monotonic, Bernoullian and Continuous).
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Finally, it is convenient to allow for representation of preferences by means of functionals
that are not normalized. The following straightforward result guarantees that, as long as such
functionals are isotone, they can be re-normalized while preserving the essential properties of
monotonicity and, especially, continuity.
Lemma 2 Let Γ be an interval with non-empty interior, and consider an isotone, monotonic,
continuous functional I : Bb (Σ,Γ)→R. Then there exists a unique monotonic, continuous and
normalized functional Iˆ : Bb (Σ,Γ) → R such that I (a ) ≥ I (b ) if and only if Iˆ (a ) ≥ Iˆ (b ) for all
a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ).
5.3 Additional axioms and properties of I
We conclude by listing five axioms that are employed in specific models, and imply that the
preference can be represented per Proposition 1 by a pair (I , u ) in which the functional I enjoys
additional properties. The first is the well-known Ambiguity Hedging axiom due to Schmeidler
(1989). It is equivalent to the existence of a representation with I quasiconcave.
Axiom 7 (Ambiguity Hedging) For all f , g ∈F and λ∈ [0, 1]: f ∼ g implies λ f +(1−λ)g ¼ g .
Next, we recall three weakenings of the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) Independence ax-
iom. The first is due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and is equivalent to (the existence of a
representation with) a constant-linear I .
Axiom 8 (Certainty Independence) For all f , g ∈ F , x ∈ X , and λ ∈ (0, 1]: f  g if and only if
λ f +(1−λ)x λg +(1−λ)x .
The second is due to Maccheroni et al. (2006); it is equivalent to translation invariance of I .
Axiom 9 (Weak Certainty Independence) For all f , g ∈ F , x , y ∈ X , and λ ∈ (0, 1): λ f + (1−
λ)x ¼λg +(1−λ)x implies λ f +(1−λ)y ¼λg +(1−λ)y .
For the third axiom, fix a distinguished prize x0 ∈ X ; given a representation (I , u ) with
u (x0) = 0, it is equivalent to positive homogeneity of I (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2008; Chateauneuf
and Faro, 2006).
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Axiom 10 (Homotheticity) For all f , g ∈ F and λ,µ ∈ (0, 1]: λ f + (1− λ)x0 ¼ λg + (1− λ)x0
implies µ f +(1−µ)x0 ¼µg +(1−µ)x0.
6 Relevant Priors: definition and characterization
We now formalize the central notion of this paper (cf. Sec. 2):
Definition 1 Let ¼ be an MBC preference with representation (I , u ). A weak∗-closed, convex
set D ⊂ ba1(Σ) is a set of relevant priors for ¼ iff it satisfies the following two properties:
(i) for all f , g ∈F , Q(u ◦ f )≥Q(u ◦ g ) for all Q ∈D implies f ¼ g ; and
(ii) if D ′ (D is non-empty, weak∗-closed and convex, there exist f , g ∈F such that Q(u ◦ f )≥
Q(u ◦ g ) for all Q ∈D ′, but f ≺ g .
As promised in the Introduction, we establish existence and uniqueness of relevant priors
by relating this notion to the definition of unambiguous preference due to GMM/N:
Definition 2 Let f , g ∈ F . We say that f is unambiguously preferred to g , denoted f ¼∗ g , if
for every h ∈F and all λ∈ (0, 1], λ f +(1−λ)h ¼λg +(1−λ)h.
Relative to GMM/N, our basic axioms on the primitive preference ¼, are weaker: we do not
impose Certainty Independence. Nevertheless, the unambiguous preference ¼∗ still admits a
Bewley-style representation as in GMM/N:
Proposition 3 Consider an MBC preference¼, and let¼∗ be as in Definition 2. Then there exists
a non-empty, unique, convex and weak∗-closed set C ⊂ ba1(Σ) such that, for all f , g ∈F ,
f ¼∗ g ⇐⇒
∫
u ◦ f d P ≥
∫
u ◦ g d P for all P ∈C ,
where u is the function obtained in Proposition 1. Moreover, C is independent of the choice of
normalization of u .
The last sentence —which follows from the structure of the Bewley-style representation and the
uniqueness of C given u — shows that C is cardinally invariant, even though I is not.
We can finally relate the set C to the set of relevant priors:
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Proposition 4 For any MBC preference¼, the set C in Proposition 3 is the unique set of relevant
priors.
6.1 Clarke-Rockafellar Differential(s) and C
We now come to the main contribution of the present paper: we establish a connection between
relevant priors and Clarke-Rockafellar differentials of the functional I .
The following definitions are based on Clarke (1983, Def. 2.4.10 and Corollary to Theorem
2.9.1); we specialize them to the case of a continuous functional I , as delivered by Proposition
1. We note that given an MBR representation (I , u ), the set Bb (Σ, u (X )) has non-empty interior
(see Lemma 17 in the Appendix).
Definition 3 Consider a continuous functional I : U → R, where U ⊂ B (Σ) is open. For every
e ∈U and a ∈ B (Σ), the Clarke-Rockafellar (upper) derivative of I in e in the direction a is
I C R (e ; a ) = lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b−a‖<ε
I (d + t b )− I (d )
t
.
The Clarke-Rockafellar differential of I at e is the set
∂ I (e ) = {Q ∈ ba(Σ) : Q(a )≤ I C R (e ; a ), ∀a ∈ B (Σ)}.
Henceforth, we shall abbreviate the expression “Clarke-Rockafellar” by CR.
In the setting of GMM, the functional I is constant-linear, so that: 1) it extends uniquely
to all of B (Σ); 2) it is (globally hence) locally Lipschitz. For locally Lipschitz functionals, the
CR derivative and differential correspond to Clarke’s notions, which have a simpler expression
(see Appedix B). Moreover, the Clarke upper derivative at 0 in the direction a ∈ B (Σ), denoted
I c (0; a ), when I is constant-linear takes the particularly simple form
I c (0; a ) = sup
d∈B (Σ)
I (d +a )− I (d )
(cf. GMM, Prop. A.3). We cannot take advantage of this simpler form, and will work directly with
Def. 3; furthermore, unlike GMM, we shall need to compute CR differentials at all points in the
interior of the domain of I . However, the CR differential retains most of the useful features of
the Clarke differential, and it does not require Lipschitz behavior even locally.
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It is also important to point out that, not unlike the usual notion of gradient, the definition
of CR differential is seldom used directly (although we do so in proving Theorem 5). It is useful
chiefly because of its convenient calculus properties.
We are ready to state our main result. We consider a representation (I , u )wherein the func-
tional I is isotone, but not necessarily normalized; this simplifies the calculation of the CR dif-
ferential for some decision models (in particular, smooth-ambiguity preferences).
Theorem 5 Consider an MBC preference ¼ represented as in Eq. (1) by a non-constant, affine
function u : X → R and a monotonic, continuous and isotone functional I : Bb (Σ, u (X ))→ R
Then, the set C in Proposition 3 can be computed as follows:
C = co
 ⋃
e∈int Bb (Σ,u (X ))

Q
Q(S)
: Q ∈ ∂ I (e ), Q(S)> 0
 .
Therefore, the set C of relevant priors is equal to the convex closure of the union of all the CR
differentials, once the latter are properly renormalized so as to contain only probability mea-
sures.
It is useful to relate the general statement above to interesting special cases. This will also
make apparent the extent to which our result generalizes its counterpart in GMM. Thus, sup-
pose that the functional I satisfies the properties assumed in Theorem 5. If I is also translation-
invariant (as can be obtained by imposing Axiom 9), all elements Q ∈ ∂ I (e ) automatically sat-
isfy the normalization Q(S) = 1 (see statement 2 of Prop. A.3 in GMM). Moreover, a monotonic,
translation-invariant functional is globally Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant 1 (see, e.g., Mac-
cheroni et al., 2006). So we have:
Corollary 6 If I is normalized and translation-invariant, then C = co
⋃
e∈int Bb (Σ,u (X )) ∂ I (e )

.
If instead the functional I is positively homogeneous (cf. Axiom 10), as well as locally Lip-
schitz, and furthermore if 0 ∈ int u (X ), then ∂ I (e ) ⊂ ∂ I (0S) for all interior points e , where 0S
denotes the constantly 0 function (cf. statement 1 of Prop. A.3 in GMM). By positive homo-
geneity, I can be extended to all of B (Σ) by assuming that u (X )⊃ [−1, 1]. Therefore, Theorem 5
specializes as follows:
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Corollary 7 If I is normalized, positively homogeneous and locally Lipschitz, and 0 ∈ int u (X ),
then C = co
n
Q
Q(S) : Q ∈ ∂ I (0), Q(S)> 0
o
.
Third, and finally, GMM consider preferences that satisfy Axiom 8 (Certainty Independence),
and hence admit a representation with I constant-linear; i.e., both positively homogeneous and
translation-invariant. For such preferences, we combine the preceding corollaries to obtain
Corollary 8 (GMM, Theorem 14) If I is constant-linear, then C = ∂ I (0).
6.2 Calculation for specific decision models
The differential characterization in Theorem 5 is mainly useful because the properties of CR dif-
ferentials may be used to compute the set C of ambiguous beliefs for specific decision models.
This section carries out these calculations for a variety of recent preference representations.
We begin with multiplier preferences, mainly because, in case the state space is finite, a di-
rect computation based on the formula provided by Theorem 5 is straightforward. We find this
useful to build intuition. We then consider three decision models, namely smooth ambiguity,
VEU preferences, and mean-variance preferences, for which the computations leverage the ba-
sic calculus of CR differentials; in particular, they employ the so-called “fuzzy sum rule,” the
chain rule, and a convenient formula for the Clarke differential of integral functionals. Finally,
we consider preferences which satisfy the Ambiguity Hedging axiom, such as the variational
and Chateauneuf-Faro preferences. Here, the calculations rely mainly on the relationship be-
tween CR differentials and normal cones of sublevel sets.
6.2.1 Multiplier Preferences
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999); Hansen and Sargent (2001) introduced multiplier pref-
erences, a specification that has gained considerable popularity due to its tractability. Each act
f ∈ F is evaluated according to the functional V ( f ) = I (u ◦ f ), where u is a Bernoulli utility
function,
I (a ) = min
Q∈ca1(Σ)
(Q(a )+θR(Q‖P)) ,
P ∈ ca1(Σ) is a (countably additive) reference prior, and R(Q‖P) denotes the relative entropy of
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Q ∈ ca1(Σ) with respect to P . The functional I is well-defined, monotonic and continuous on
B (Σ), so multiplier preferences are MBC preferences; furthermore, I is translation-invariant, so
Corollary 6 can be applied. The cited authors note that the functional I can be represented as
I (a ) =−θ logP e− aθ , which is convenient for the purposes of computing the set C .
To gain intuition, suppose that S is finite. Then I is a continuously differentiable function
onR|S|; the Corollary to Proposition 2.2.1 and Proposition 2.2.4 in Clarke (1983) imply that ∂ I (e )
is the gradient of I at e for every e ∈ int B0(Σ, u (X )) = int u (X )|S|. Therefore, denoting by∆(S)≡
ba1(2S) the probability simplex and invoking Corollary 6,
C = co
¦
Pa ,θ ∈∆(S) : a ∈R|S|© , where Pa ,θ ≡ e− a (s )θ P({s })
P(e− aθ )
!
s∈S
. (2)
Now fix s ∈ S and consider the function a K ,s : R|S|→ R such that a K ,s (s ) = 0 and a K ,s (s ′) = K θ .
Then Pa K ,s ,θ ({s }) = P({s })P({s })+e−K P(S\{s }) → 1 as K →∞. This implies that
C =∆(S).
For the general case of S infinite, a formula similar to Eq. (2) can be obtained by adapting the
techniques in the proof of Proposition 9 below. The details are omitted.
6.2.2 Smooth Ambiguity Preferences
Klibanoff et al. (2005, KMM henceforth) propose and axiomatize the smooth ambiguity model,
according to which acts f ∈F are evaluated by means of the functional V :F →R defined by
V ( f ) =
∫
ba1(Σ)
φ
 
Q(u ◦ f ) dµ(Q). (3)
Here, u is a Bernoulli (first-order) utility function, φ : u (X ) → R is a continuous and strictly
increasing second-order utility, and similarly µ is a second-order probability defined over ba1(Σ)
(the reader is referred to KMM for details).
To see that smooth-ambiguity preferences are MBC preferences as well, write V ( f ) = I (u ◦ f ),
where the functional I : Bb (Σ, u (X )) → R is defined by I (a ) = ∫ φ(Q(a )) dµ(Q) for every a ∈
Bb (Σ, u (X )). Note that, for any sequence (a k )⊂ Bb (Σ, u (X )) that converges to a ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) in
the supremum norm, the integrals Q(a k ) =
∫
a k dQ converge to Q(a ) uniformly in Q ∈ ba1(Σ);
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thus, φ(Q(a k )) → φ(Q(a )) uniformly in Q ,7 which guarantees that I (a k ) → I (a ): that is, the
functional I is continuous on Bb (Σ, u (X )). Monotonicity is immediate, as is the fact that I is
isotone (but not normalized in general); thus, smooth-ambiguity preferences are members of
the MBC class.
Before we provide a general formula for the set C of ambiguous beliefs, consider the simple
case of a finite state space S and continuously differentiable second-order utility φ. Then I is a
continuously differentiable function on a subset ofR|S|, and we immediately get
C = co

∫∆(S)φ′(Q(e ))Q({s })dµ(Q)∫
∆(S)
φ′(Q(e ))dµ(Q)

s∈S
: e ∈ int u (X )|S|
 .
For general state spaces, we can leverage results by Clarke (1983) on the differential of inte-
gral functionals to provide a formula that covers most cases of thoretical and applied interest.
We require a notion of regularity for functions and functionals. As it will play a role in other
results, we provide a general definition.
Definition 4 (Clarke, 1983, p. 39) A function f : B→R on a Banach space B is regular at b ∈ B
if, for all v ∈ B , the directional derivative
f ′(b ; v )≡ lim
t ↓0
f (b + t v )− f (b )
t
is well-defined and coincides with f CR(b ; v ).
Note that f is regular if it is convex (hence − f is regular if f is concave), or if it is continuously
differentiable (cf. Clarke, 1983, Corollary to Prop. 2.2.4 and Prop. 2.3.6).
Proposition 9 Suppose that S is a Polish space and Σ is its Borel sigma-algebra. Consider a
smooth ambiguity preference represented by (u ,µ,φ), where φ is locally Lipschitz, either φ or
−φ is regular, and µ is a Borel measure on the space ca1(Σ) of countably additive probabilities,
endowed with theσ(ca(Σ),C (S)) topology (i.e., the usual weak-convergence topology).
7Since a k → a uniformly and a , (a k ) ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), there exists an interval [α,β ]⊂ u (X ) such that a k (s ) ∈ [α,β ]
for all s and k , and similarly a (s ) ∈ [α,β ] for all s . Hence, for all Q ∈ ba1(Σ), Q(a k ) ∈ [α,β ] for all k , and also
Q(a ) ∈ [α,β ]. Now φ is continuous, and hence uniformly continuous on the compact interval [α,β ]; hence, for
every ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that |γ−γ′|< δ implies |φ(γ)−φ(γ′)|< ε. In particular, if k is large enough so that
‖a k −a‖<δ, we have |Q(a k )−Q(a )|<δ for all Q , and hence |φ(Q(a k ))−φ(Q(a ))|<ε for all Q , as required.
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Then
C = co
∫ca1(Σ)αe ,Q Q dµ(Q)∫
ca1(Σ)
αe ,Q dµ(Q)
:
e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), ∫ca1(Σ)αe ,Q dµ(Q)> 0,
Q 7→αe ,Q a measurable selection from Q 7→ ∂ φ(Q(e ))
 . (4)
To interpret the notation employed above, eachαe ,Q is a real number, and L =
∫
ca1(Σ)
αe ,QQ dµ(Q)
is the linear functional on B (Σ) such that L(a ) =
∫
ca1(Σ)
αe ,QQ(a )dµ(Q) for all a . In caseφ is con-
tinuously differentiable, ∂ φ(Q(e )) = {φ′(Q(e ))}, and one obtains a simpler formula similar to
the one provided above for the case of S finite. The existence of suitable measurable selections
from the correspondence Q 7→ ∂ φ(Q(e )) is established in the proof of Proposition 9.
A function is locally Lipschitz if it is concave or convex, or if it is continuously differentiable;
also, as noted above, any one of these conditions implies regularity of either φ or −φ. Hence,
the above result covers virtually all specifications of smooth ambiguity preferences used in ap-
plications, as well as specifications that are neither ambiguity-averse nor ambiguity-loving.
Examples. Assume thatφ is CARA, i.e. φ(x ) =−e− xθ , and that S and supp(µ), the support of
µ, are finite. Fix an exposed pointQ ∈ supp(µ); then there is a ∈ int u (X )|S| such thatQ(a )<Q ′(a )
for all Q ′ ∈ supp(µ) \ {Q}. Let a K ,θ = K θa : then, for every s ∈S,
Qa K ,θ ,θ ({s }) =
Q({s })µ(Q)+∑Q ′ 6=Q e−K [Q ′(a )−Q(a )]Q ′({s })µ(Q ′)
µ(Q)+
∑
Q ′ 6=Q e−K [Q
′(a )−Q(a )]µ(Q ′)
→Q({s })
as K →∞. Therefore,
C = co supp(µ).
In general, the set C is included in co supp(µ), and even in the concave case, the inclusion
can be strict. For instance, let S = {s1, s2}, µ({Q1}) =µ({Q2}) = 12 and Q1({s1}) =Q2({s2}) = 34 ; also,
let X =R+, u (x ) = x , andφ(x ) = x
1−γ
1−γ , with γ> 0. Then, applying the above characterization,
C = co
 12  34 x + 14 y −γQ1+ 12  14 x + 34 y −γQ2
1
2

3
4
x + 1
4
y
−γ
+ 1
2

1
4
x + 3
4
y
−γ : x , y ∈R++
=
= co

[3x + y ]−γQ1+[x +3y ]−γQ2
[3x + y ]−γ+[x +3y ]−γ : x , y ∈R++

=
= co

[3+ t ]−γQ1+[1+3t ]−γQ2
[3+ t ]−γ+[1+3t ]−γ : t ∈R++

=
= co
 
1
1+

3+t
1+3t
γQ1+  3+t1+3t γ
1+

3+t
1+3t
γQ2 : t ∈R++!=αQ1+(1−α)Q2 : α∈  11+3γ , 3γ1+3γ

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which is a strict subset of co supp(µ). Also observe that, unlike in the CARA case, the set C is
now determined jointly by µ andφ.
6.2.3 Vector Expected Utility
Siniscalchi (2009) introduces and axiomatizes the vector expected utility (VEU) model, accord-
ing to which acts f ∈F are evaluated via the index
V ( f ) = I (u ◦ f ), where I (a ) = P(a )+A (P(ζi a ))0≤i<n ∀a ∈ B0(Σ, u (X ));
here, u is a Bernoulli utility function, P is a countably additive baseline probability, 0≤ n ≤∞,
ζi : S → R is a bounded adjustment factor that satisfies P(ζi ) = 0 for 0 ≤ i < n , and the adjust-
ment function A : Rn → R satisfies A(0) = 0 and A(ϕ) = A(−ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ Rn . Suitable assump-
tions ensure that I is monotonic; also, the VEU functional I admits a monotonic, continuous
extension to Bb (Σ, u (X )). Hence VEU preferences also belong to the MBC class.
VEU preferences are translation-invariant, but not positively homogeneous; furthermore,
they need not be ambiguity-averse (or -loving). For instance, Siniscalchi (2008) shows by exam-
ple that VEU preferences can accommodate the “reflection” example of Machina (2009), which
requires relaxing Ambiguity Hedging. Indeed, VEU preferences can exhibit non-uniform am-
biguity attitudes (cf. Siniscalchi, 2007). Thus, they provide an ideal testing ground for the tools
developed in this paper.
We now explicitly compute the set C as a function of the elements of the representation
for a rich class of VEU preferences. Specifically, we assume that n <∞ (which, again, can be
characterized behaviorally) and that the adjustment function A, or its negative −A, is regular
in the sense of Definition 4. The latter is true if, say, A is continuously differentiable (taking
advantage of the fact that in VEU A is defined on some Euclidean space Rn ), or if it is concave
or convex.8
To state the result, it is convenient to define, for every 0≤ i < n , the functional M i : B0(Σ)→
R by M i (a ) = P(ζi a ) =
∫
ζi a d P for all a ∈ B0(Σ). Also note that, since A is a function on Rn ,
every L ∈ ∂ A can be identified with a vector (α0)0≤i<n in Rn . Observe that no restriction is
imposed on the cardinality of the state space S.
8Indeed, a direct calculation of the set C is often feasible when the functional A is parametrically specified.
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Proposition 10 Consider a VEU preference with representation (u , P, n , (ζi )0≤i<n , A). If u (X ) has
non-empty interior, n <∞ and either A or−A is regular, then
C = co
(
P +
∑
0≤i<n
αi M i : (αi )0≤i<n ∈ ∂ A (M 0(a ), . . . , M n−1(a )) for some a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X ))
)
.
6.2.4 Monotonic Mean-Dispersion Preferences
Grant and Polak (2007) propose a model of “mean-dispersion” preferences that generalizes vari-
ational preferences (see below) for the case of a finite state space and unbounded utility. For-
mally, consider: a Bernoulli utility function u : X → R with u (X ) = R; a vector pi ∈ RS with∑
s pis = 1; a continuous function ϕ : R2 → R, increasing in the first argument and decreasing
in the second, and such that ϕ(γ, 0) = 0; a function ρ : {v ∈ Rn : v ·pi = 0} → R+ with ρ(0) = 0.
Preferences are represented by the functional
V (h) =ϕ(µ,ρ(d )) where µ=pi ·u ◦ f and d = u ◦ f −µ1S . (5)
Mean-dispersion preferences allow for a weakening of monotonicity. However, when mono-
tonicity holds, these preferences are a member of the MBC family, and pi is a probability dis-
tribution (other cross-restrictions on the elements of the representation hold as well). When
ϕ(µ,ρ) =µ+ρ, the mean-dispersion functional is similar to the VEU functional (cf. Sec. 6.2.3).
(See Siniscalchi (2009), Sec. 5.1 for discussion of the relationship between mean-dispersion and
VEU preferences.)
We compute the set C for monotone mean-dispersion preferences under regularity assump-
tions. We let I (a ) =ϕ(a ·pi,ρ(a − (a ·pi))1S).
Proposition 11 Assume that S is finite, I is monotonic, and that maps (µ,ρ) 7→ ϕ(µ,−ρ) and
d 7→ −ρ(d ) are locally Lipschitz and regular. Then
C = co
pi+ β2β1 ∑s αs (1{s }−pi) : e ∈ intR
S , (β1,β2)∈ ∂ ϕ(e ·pi,ρ(e − e ·pi1S)),
β1 > 0, α∈ ∂ ρ(e − e ·pi1S)
 .
An important special case is that of an additive aggregator: ϕ(µ,ρ) =µ−ρ. In this case, the
only requirement is that the function −ρ(·) be locally Lipschitz and regular, which is the case,
for instance, if ρ(·) is concave. With an additive aggregator, β1 = 1 and β2 =−1.
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6.2.5 Preferences that satisfy Axiom 7 (Ambiguity Hedging)
A variety of recent models generalize the MEU preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
in several ways, but retain their central Ambiguity Hedging axiom. Maccheroni et al. (2006,
MMR henceforth) define variational preferences as a generalization of both MEU and multiplier
preferences. Acts f ∈F are evaluated via the functional
V ( f ) = min
Q∈ba1(Σ)
 
Q(u ◦ f )+ c (q ) ,
where u is a Bernoulli utility function, and c : ba1(Σ)→R+ ∪ {∞} is a “cost function.” For MEU
preferences, c (·) can be taken to be the indicator function (in the sense of convex analysis) of
the relevant set of priors; for multiplier preferences, c (Q) = θR(Q‖P). As is apparent, these
preferences are translation-invariant, but not necessarily positively homogeneous
Chateauneuf and Faro (2006) propose a complementary model, which we call confidence-
function preferences (CF for short): in their representation,
V ( f ) = min
q∈ba1(Σ):ϕ(Q)≥α0
Q(u ◦ f )
ϕ(Q)
,
where α0 ∈ (0, 1] is a minimal confidence level and ϕ : ba1(Σ)→ (0, 1] is a confidence function.
These preferences may violate translation invariance, but satisfy positive homogeneity.
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) provide a representation of preferences that satisfy our Axioms
1–4 and 6 plus Ambiguity Hedging; their uncertainty averse preferences (UA henceforth) thus en-
compass both variational and CF preferences.9 Smooth ambiguity preferences with u (X ) =R, µ
countably additive, and concave second-order utilityφ [henceforth, “smooth UA preferences”]
are also elements of this family. The UA representation evaluates acts f ∈F according to
V ( f ) = inf
Q∈ba1(Σ)
G
 
Q(u ◦ f ),Q. (6)
The function G : u (X )× ba1(Σ) → R ∪ {+∞} is quasiconvex, non-decreasing in its first argu-
ment, and such that infQ∈ba1(Σ)G (γ,Q) = γ for all γ ∈ u (X ). For variational preferences, G (t ,Q) =
9In our language, such preferences would naturally be called “ambiguity-hedging preferences.” But we prefer
to adopt Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008)’s terminology. Also, strictly speaking, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) show that
a variant of CF preferences, for which u (X ) = R and two confidence functions are used, are UA preferences; in
Chateauneuf and Faro (2006), u (X ) =R+. However, the proof of our Proposition 12 below applies verbatim to the
original CF model.
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t + c (Q); for CF preferences, G (t ,Q) = t
ϕ(Q) if ϕ(Q) ≥ α0, and G (t ,Q) = +∞ otherwise. For the
purposes of our analysis, we let I (a ) = infQ∈ba1(Σ)G (Q(a ),Q) for all a ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )); notice that I
is normalized, due to the properties of the UA representation.
We can leverage our Theorem 5 and the general functional characterization of UA prefer-
ences provided by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) to compute the set C for all the decision models
considered in this section in a single result. Relative to the most general UA preference speci-
fication, we require mild regularity conditions that are satisfied by all the notable special cases
alluded to above; i.e., variational (and hence also multiplier), CF, and smooth UA preferences.10
The key requirement is that the CR differential of the functional I not contain the zero mea-
sure (or functional); loosely speaking, this is equivalent to the assumption that, for every point
a in the interior of Bb (Σ, u (X )), there be a neighborhood of a in which the functional represen-
tation I decreases approximately linearly for sufficiently small displacements in some direction.
Rockafellar (1979) discusses this condition, which may be restated as saying that I admits no
“substationary points” in the interior of is domain, and is thus related to monotonicity.
Definition 5 Denote by Q0 ∈ ba(Σ) the zero measure: Q(E ) = 0 for all E ∈Σ. An MBC represen-
tation (I , u ) is nice if, for all a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), Q0 6∈ ∂ I (a ).
As noted above, all commonly used UA preference models satisfy the above requirement;
furthermore, while the UA functional is defined and characterized by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008)
on B0(Σ, u (X )), these common models admit a continuous extension to all of Bb (Σ, u (X )), and
hence belong to the MBC family as well:
Remark 6.1 Variational, CF and smooth UA preferences admit a nice MBC representation (I , u ).
Our characterization result follows.
Proposition 12 Consider a UA representation (u ,G ) that admits a nice MBC representation,
and is such that the infimum in Eq. (6) is attained for every f ∈F . Then
C = co
 ⋃
e∈int Bb (Σ,u (X ))
arg min
Q∈ba1(Σ)
G (Q(e ), e )
 .
10The quasi-arithmetic preferences considered by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) also satisfy these conditions.
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For S finite (or, we conjecture, compact metric), the above result can be established without
assuming that UA preferences are nice, and instead requiring that the functional I be locally
Lipschitz. Finally, we observe that Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) have independently obtained
an analogous result for UA preferences. Their analysis does not employ Clarke-Rockafellar dif-
ferentials, but highlights an interesting connection with the Greenberg and Pierskalla (1973)
differential employed in quasiconvex optimization.
7 Consequences
We conclude by providing definitions and characterizations of “crisp acts” (cf. GMM, Def. 9)
and unambiguous events for MBC preferences.
7.1 Certainty equivalents, crisp acts and behavioral test for priors in C
We first introduce convenient notation. For any measure Q ∈ ba1(Σ) and function a ∈ B (Σ),
let Q(a ) =
∫
a dQ . Also, given a weak∗ closed set D ⊂ ba1(Σ) and function a ∈ B (Σ), let D(a ) =
minQ∈D Q(a ) and D(a ) =maxQ∈D Q(a ).
For f ∈F and D =C , the quantities C (u ◦ f ) and C (u ◦ f ) have a behavioral characterization.
Recall that a prize x f ∈ X is a certainty equivalent of an act f if f ∼ x f . We want to define
a corresponding notion for the unambiguous preference ¼∗; however, since the latter is not
complete in general, we identify lower and upper certainty equivalents. This is related to the
definition of the set C ∗( f ) in GMM, p. 158.
Definition 6 For any act f ∈F , a lower certainty equivalent of f is a prize x f ∈ X such that (i)
f ¼∗ x f and (ii) for all y ∈ X such that f ¼∗ y , x f ¼ y . Similarly, an upper certainty equivalent
of f is a prize x f ∈X such that (i) f ´∗ x f and (ii) for all y ∈X such that f ´∗ y , x f ´ y .
We then have:11
11We henceforth follow the convention, when a result is proved by straightforward adaptation of existing argu-
ments, of adding an explicit reference to the original argument and omitting the proof.
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Corollary 13 (GMM, Proposition 18) Every act f ∈F admits lower and upper certainty equiv-
alents. Furthermore, for every lower and upper certainty equivalent x f ,x f ,
u (x f ) =C (u ◦ f ) and u (x f ) =C (u ◦ f ).
The notion of lower certainty equivalent can be used to verify whether a given probability
P ∈ ba1(Σ) belongs to the set C —i.e., it is relevant— without invoking Proposition 3, and indeed
using only behavioral data (i.e. the DM’s preferences).
Further notation is needed. Fix P ∈ ba1(Σ) and f ∈F , and suppose that f =∑ni=1 x i 1E i for a
collection of distinct prizes x1, . . . ,xn and a measurable partition E1, . . . , En of S. Then, define
xP, f ≡ P(E1)x1+ . . .+P(En )xn .
That is, xP, f ∈ X is a mixture of the prizes x1, . . . ,xn delivered by f , with weights given by the
probabilities that P assigns to each event E1, . . . , En . Recall that, since u is affine with respect to
the vector-space structure on X , u (xP, f ) = P(u ◦ f ).
The sought test is obtained as a straightforward consequence of our results and well-known
properties of support functionals. The details are as follows.
Corollary 14 For a probability charge P ∈ ba1(Σ), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) P ∈C
(ii) for all f ∈F , x f ´ xP, f
7.2 Crisp acts and unambiguous events
GMM deem an act crisp if it cannot be used to hedge the ambiguity of any other act. In our set-
ting without Certainty Independence, the behavioral condition has to be strengthened some-
how: We say that an act is crisp if it is unambiguously indifferent to a constant.12 More precisely,
denote by ∼∗ the symmetric component of ¼∗. Then, say that an act f ∈F is crisp if f ∼∗ x for
some x ∈X ; equivalently, f is crisp if, for all g ∈F and λ∈ [0, 1], λ f +(1−λ)g ∼λx +(1−λ)g .
Corollary 15 An act f ∈F is crisp if and only if C (u ◦ f ) =C (u ◦ f ).
12For GMM’s preferences the two conditions are equivalent. See Corollary 15 and their Prop. 10.
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Crisp acts are clearly related to unambiguous acts. Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
(2005, henceforth GMMu) characterize unambiguous acts and events for GMM (i.e. constant-
linear) preferences. We now generalize part of their discussion of unambiguous events to the
broader class of MBC preferences. We refer the reader to GMMu for the discussion of unam-
biguous acts (which also generalizes) and for more detailed interpretation.
An event is unambiguous if if any bet on such event is crisp. Precisely:
Definition 7 An event A ∈ Σ is unambiguous if and only if for any x , y ∈ X with x  y , the act
x A y is crisp. The set of unambiguous events is denoted Λ.
(It can be shown that the definition could be equivalently stated as “for some x  y ...”.) Con-
versely, A is ambiguous if x A y 6∼∗ z for any z ∈ X ; that is, if x A y ∼ z , then there exist λ ∈ (0, 1],
g ∈F such that λx A y +(1−λ)g 6∼λz +(1−λ)g .
Unambiguous events have a natural characterization in terms of the set of priors C .
Proposition 16 (GMMu, Proposition 8) For any MBC preference with set of priors C and any
event A ∈Σ, A ∈Λ if and only if P(A) =Q(A) for all P,Q ∈C .
That is, an event is unambiguous when all the probabilities in C agree on it. (Notice that this is
independent of the normalization chosen for u .) In light of this characterization, it is immedi-
ate to verify that Λ is a (finite) λ-system (GMMu, Corollary 9). That is: 1) S ∈ Λ; 2) if A ∈ Λ then
Ac ∈Λ; 3) if A, B ∈Λ and A ∩ B = ; then A ∪ B ∈Λ. (Cf. Zhang (2002) and Nehring (1999).)
A Preliminaries on subsets of B (Σ)
The following result characterizes properties of the subsets of B (Σ) of interest in this paper. To
fix ideas, it is also useful to compare Bb (Σ,Γ) with B (Σ,Γ), the set of bounded, Σ-measurable
functions with values in Γ: in particular, if S = Γ = (0, 1) and Σ is the Borel sigma-algebra, the
identity function is in B (Σ,Γ) but not in Bb (Σ,Γ).
Also recall that, given an MBC representation (I , u ), non-triviality implies that u is non-
constant and affine, so that u (X ) is an interval with non-empty interior.
Lemma 17 Let Γ be an interval with non-empty interior. Then:
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1. Bb (Σ,Γ) = {a ∈ B (Σ) : infs a (s ), sups a (s )∈ Γ};
2. int Bb (Σ,Γ) = {a ∈ B (Σ) : infs a (s ), sups a (s )∈ int Γ};
3. cl Bb (Σ,Γ) = Bb (Σ, cl Γ) = B (Σ, cl Γ).
Proof: For 1, fix a ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ). By assumption there are α,β ∈ Γ such that α≥ a (s )≥ β for all
s : hence α≥ sups a ≥ infs a ≥β , so infs a , sups a ∈ Γ, as required. The converse is immediate.
For 2, fix a ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ). Then there exists ε > 0 such that, for all b ∈ B (Σ), ‖b − a‖ < ε
implies b ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ). Then in particular a − 1S ε2 , a + 1S ε2 ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), which implies that infs a −
ε
2
, sups a +
ε
2
∈ Γ by part 1: that is, infs a , sups a ∈ int Γ. Conversely, consider a ∈ B (Σ) such that
infs a , sups a ∈ int Γ; choose ε > 0 so that infs a − ε, sups a + ε ∈ Γ, and consider b ∈ B (Σ) such
that ‖b−a‖<ε: then infs b ≥ infs a+infs (b−a ) = infs a−sups (a−b )≥ infs a−‖a−b‖> infs a−ε
and sups b ≤ sups a + sups (b −a )≤ sups a + ‖b −a‖< sups a +ε. Hence, infs b , sups b ∈ Γ, and
part 1 implies that b ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ). Thus, a ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ).
For 3, consider a ∈ cl Bb (Σ,Γ), so there is a sequence (a k ) ⊂ Bb (Σ,Γ) such that a k → a .
By part 1, infs a k , sups a
k ∈ Γ, and by continuity of inf and sup, infs a k → infs a and sups a k →
sups a ; since the numerical sequences (infs a k ), (sups a k ) lie in Γ, their limits by definition lie in
cl Γ; furthermore, for every s ∈S, the fact that sups a k ≥ a k (s )≥ infs a k for all k implies sups a ≥
a (s )≥ infs a by continuity of the infimum and supremum on B (Σ): hence, a ∈ Bb (Σ, cl Γ). Next,
if a ∈ Bb (Σ, cl Γ), then a (S)⊂ cl Γ and furthermore there are α,β ∈ cl Γwith+∞>α≥ a (s )≥β >
−∞ for all s , so a is bounded and thus a ∈ B (Σ, cl Γ). Finally, if a ∈ B (Σ, cl Γ), then infs a , sups a ∈
cl Γ. If infs a = sups b , then a = 1Sγ for some γ ∈ cl Γ and it is clear that a ∈ cl Bb (Σ,Γ). Oth-
erwise, let γ = 1
2
infs a + 12 sups a ∈ int Γ, and for all k ≥ 1 define a k = 1k γ+ k−1k a . Then, for all
k and all s ∈ S, a k (s ) ≥ 1
k
γ+ k−1
k
infs a ∈ Γ, and similarly a k (s ) ≤ 1k γ+ k−1k sups a ∈ Γ; hence, for
all k , infs a k , sups a
k ∈ Γ, so by part 1 a k ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ) (indeed, a k is in the interior) and therefore
a ∈ cl Bb (Σ,Γ), as claimed.
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B Clarke-Rockafellar and Clarke Derivatives and Differentials
Note first that, relative to our Def. 3, Rockafellar’s original definition (e.g., Rockafellar, 1979)
allows for I discontinuous, in which case the limsup must be taken over sequences b → a such
that I (b )→ I (a ). His definition also allows for I extended real-valued and defined on all of B (Σ).
The following lemma clarifies that the definition of CR derivative is local: only behavior in
a neighborhood of the point of interest matters. This is important for our purposes, as our
functional I is in general defined only on a subset of B (Σ). Note that continuity is assumed only
in order to apply our slightly simplified definition of the CR derivative (i.e. Def. 3).
Lemma 18 Let I , J be real-valued functionals on B (Σ), and suppose that, for some open subset
U of B (Σ), both I and J are continuous on U , and I (e ) = J (e ) for all e ∈U . Then, for all e ∈U
and a ∈ B (Σ), I CR(e ; a ) = J CR(e ; a ) and ∂ I (e ) = ∂ J (e ). The same conclusion holds if I is defined
and continuous only on U .
Proof: It is of course enough to prove the assertion regarding CR derivatives; morevoer, by
inspecting Def. 3, we only need to show that, for every e ∈U , a ∈ B (Σ), and ε> 0,
lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b−a‖<ε
I (d + t b )− I (d )
t
= lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b−a‖<ε
J (d + t b )− J (d )
t
.
Thus, consider sequences (d k ), (t k ) such that d k → e , t k ↓ 0, and infb :‖b−a‖<ε I (d k+t k b )−I (d k )t k → γ ∈
R∪{±∞} as k →∞. For the given a and ε, we can findη,λ> 0 such that ‖d−e ‖<η and t ∈ (0,λ)
imply d ∈U and, importantly, also d + t b ∈U for all b ∈ B (Σ) with ‖b − a‖ < ε.13 Therefore,
there exists K such that k ≥ K implies d k , d k + t k b ∈U for all b with ‖b − a‖ < ε; hence, for
such k , infb :‖b−a‖<ε I (d
k+t k b )−I (d k )
t k
= infb :‖b−a‖<ε J (d
k+t k b )−J (d k )
t k
, and so infb :‖b−a‖<ε J (d
k+t k b )−J (d k )
t k
→ γ.
Switching the role of I and J shows that, for any sequence d → e and t ↓ 0, infb :‖b−a‖<ε I (d+t b )−I (d )t
has a limit λ (possibly infinite) if and only if infb :‖b−a‖<ε J (d+t b )−J (d )t has the same limit. The above
equality then follows.
If I is defined and continuous on U , it can be extended arbitrarily to a functional on B (Σ),
which will then satisfy the stated conditions.
13Since U is open, there is δ > 0 such that ‖d ′− e ‖< δ implies d ′ ∈U : thus, if 0< t < δ
2(‖a‖+ε) ≡ λ, then for all b
with ‖b −a‖< ε we have ‖(e + t b )− e ‖= t ‖b‖ ≤ t (‖a‖+ ‖b −a‖)< t (‖a‖+ε)< 1
2
δ, and if ‖d − e ‖< 1
2
δ ≡ η, then
‖(d + t b )− e ‖ ≤ ‖d − e ‖+ t ‖b‖<δ for all such b , as required.
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The main properties of interest of I CR and ∂ I are listed in the following proposition, which
is mostly based on Aussel, Corvellec, and Lassonde (1995, ACL henceforth), specialized to our
setting. Here and in the following, for a ,b ∈ B (Σ), we let [a ,b ] = {λa +(1−λ)b : λ ∈ [0, 1]}. The
“intervals” (a ,b ), [a ,b ) and (a ,b ] are defined analogously.
Proposition 19 Let I : Bb (Σ,Γ)→R be continuous, with int Γ 6= ;. Then:
1. The set dom ∂ I ≡ {e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) : ∂ I (e ) 6= ;} is dense in Bb (Σ,Γ).
2. For every e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ), either I CR(e ; 0) =−∞or e ∈ dom ∂ I and I CR(e ; a ) = supQ∈∂ I (e )Q(a )
for all a ∈ B (Σ).
3. (Approximate Mean-Value Theorem) for all a ,b ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ), there exist a function c ∈
[a ,b ) and sequences (cn ) ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) and (Qn ) ∈ ba(Σ) such that cn → c , Qn ∈ ∂ I (cn ) for
all n , and
lim inf
n
Qn (cn − c )≥ 0, lim inf
n
Qn (b −a )≥ f (b )− f (a ).
4. I is monotonic if and only if, for all e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) and Q ∈ ∂ I (e ), Q ≥ 0.
5. If I is convex, then CR derivatives are the usual directional derivatives and CR differentials
are subdifferentials. That is, I CR(e ; a ) = limt ↓0 t −1(I (e + t a )− I (e )) for all e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ)
and a ∈ Bb (Σ), and ∂ I (e ) = {Q ∈ ba(Σ) : Q(a )−Q(e ) ≤ I (a )− I (e ) ∀a ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ)} for all
e ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ).
Proof: ACL consider l.s.c. functions defined on a Banach space with values in R∪{+∞}. Thus,
to establish the above claims, our general strategy is to use Lemma 18 and standard results to
extend I to a suitable continuous functional J on B (Σ) that has the same CR derivatives and
differential as I on Bb (Σ,Γ). It is convenient to denote by Oε(a ) the open ball of radius ε > 0
around a ∈ B (Σ), and by O¯ε(a ) its closure.
(1) For every e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ), there is ε > 0 such that Oε(e ) ⊂ int Bb (Σ,Γ); then O¯ ε2 (e ) is a
closed subset of int Bb (Σ,Γ), and since I is continuous on this set, by Tietze’s extension theorem
it admits a continuous extension Je to all of B (Σ). Corollary 3.2 in ACL then yields a dense
subset De ⊂ dom Je such that d ∈ De implies that ∂ Je (d ) 6= ;, i.e. De ⊂ dom ∂ Je ; in particular,
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since O¯ ε
2
(e )⊂ dom Je , De contains a sequence (d k )→ e that also lies in O ε2 (e )⊂ int Bb (Σ,Γ), so
∂ I (d k ) = ∂ Je (d k ) 6= ; for each k ; let D˜e = {d k } be the collection of elements of this sequence.
Then the set
⋃
e∈int Bb (Σ,Γ) D˜e is included in dom ∂ I and is dense in int Bb (Σ,Γ).
(2) is the Corollary to Theorem 2.9.1 in Clarke (1983): define I arbitrarily outside Bb (Σ,Γ), as
no restrictions are imposed on I except that it be finite wherever the differential is calculated.
(3) Let ε > 0 be such that Oε(a ),Oε(b ) ⊂ int Bb (Σ,Γ), and consider the set F = {d ∈ B (Σ) :
∃λ∈ [0, 1] s.t. ‖d −λa − (1−λ)b‖ ≤ ε
2
}. Then F is closed, has non-empty interior, and lies in the
interior of Bb (Σ,Γ),14 where I is continuous and finite; hence, there is a continuous extension
JF of I to B (Σ). Theorem 4.2 in ACL now yields a point c ∈ [a ,b ] and sequences (c n ) ∈ B (Σ),
(Qn ) such that c n → c and Qn ∈ ∂ JF (c n ) for all n , and the noted inequalities hold. Since F
contains an open neighborhood of c , for n large enough c n ∈ F ⊂ int Bb (Σ,Γ), and therefore
Qn ∈ ∂ I (c n ) = ∂ JF (c n ), as required.
(4) follows from (2) and (3). Specifically, if I is monotonic, then for all e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ), and for
all k ≥ 1, I CR(e ;−1S 1k −1E )≤ 0 from the definition; hence, from (2), supQ∈∂ I (e )Q(−1S 1k −1E )≤ 0,
or Q(1S 1k +1E )≥ 0. Since 1k 1S+1E → 1E uniformly as k →∞, Q(1E )≥ 0, i.e Q ≥ 0 for all Q ∈ ∂ I (e ).
Conversely, suppose Q ≥ 0 for all e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) and Q ∈ ∂ I (e ), and consider first a ,b ∈
int Bb (Σ,Γ) with a ≥ b . If a = b , there is nothing to prove; otherwise, (3) implies that, for
some c ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) and Q ∈ ∂ I (c ), Q(b − a ) ≥ I (b )− I (a ): but if Q ≥ 0, then Q(b − a ) ≤ 0, so
I (a ) ≥ I (b ) follows. For arbitrary a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), consider a k = k−1k a + 1k γ and b k = k−1k b + 1k γ
for some γ ∈ int Γ; then a ≥ b implies a k ≥ b k for all k , and a k ,b k ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) for all k . Thus,
I (a k )≥ I (b k ), and the result follows from continuity.
(5) is Theorem 5 in Rockafellar (1980); again define I arbitrarily outside of Bb (Σ,Γ).
Say that I is locally Lipschitz if, for every e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) there is a neighborhood U ⊂
14Suppose (d k ) ⊂ F and d k → F ∈ B (Σ); for each k , there is λk ∈ [0, 1] such that ‖d k − λk a − (1− λk )b‖ ≤
ε
2
. Then there is a subsequence of (λk ) that converges to some λ ∈ [0, 1], and by continuity of the norm also
‖d −λa − (1−λ)b‖ ≤ ε
2
: thus, F is closed. Each c ∈ [a ,b ] is in the interior of F , because by definititon ‖d − c‖< ε
2
implies d ∈ F . Finally, for each d ∈ F there is c = λa + (1−λ)b ∈ [a ,b ] such that ‖d − c‖ ≤ ε
2
; let a ′ = a + (d − c ),
b ′ =b +(d −c ) and note that λa ′+(1−λ)b ′ = d : furthermore, ‖a ′−a‖= ‖d −c‖ ≤ ε
2
<ε and similarly ‖b ′−b‖<ε,
so a ′,b ′ lie in int Bb (Σ,Γ), and hence so does d .
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Bb (Σ,Γ)of e such that the restriction of I to U is Lipschitz. If I is locally Lipschitz, then I CR(e , 0) 6=
−∞, and I CR(e ; ·) reduces to the Clarke derivative:
Definition 8 For e ∈ int Bb (Σ,Γ) and a ∈ B (Σ), the Clarke (upper) derivative of I in e in the
direction a is
I c (e ; a ) = lim sup
c→e
t ↓0
I (c + t a )− I (c )
t
.
The Clarke differential of I in e is the set ∂ I (e ) = {Q ∈ ba(Σ) : Q(a )≤ I c (e ; a ), ∀a ∈ Bb (Σ)}.
Section A.2 in GMM summarizes the key properties of interest of the Clarke differential.
It is worth emphasizing that the Clarke differential and derivative are well-defined, and enjoy
attractive properties, in any normed space. Thus, we could restrict attention to functionals
defined on B0(Σ,Γ) rather than Bb (Σ,Γ), and GMM do so (for the most part). By way of contrast,
the results in Prop. 19 require that I be defined on a subset of a complete metric space.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Observation 1: Bourbaki (1998, §8.5, Theorem 1) shows that a function f : D → Y defined on a
dense subset D of a topological space E and taking values in a regular space Y admits a unique
continuous extension to E if and only if, for every sequence (d k ) in D that converges to some
e ∈ E , the sequence f (d k ) converges to some y ∈ Y . If E and Y are complete metric spaces,
then this condition requires that the image of any Cauchy sequence in D be a Cauchy sequence
in Y ; our Axiom 5, and its name, are inspired by this condition. However, note that Bb (Σ,Γ) is
not equal to the closure of B0(Σ,Γ), unless Γ is closed. Hence, we provide a direct proof of the
existence and uniqueness of the extension. Also see Observation 2 at the end of this proof.
Sufficiency: as observed, under axioms 1–3 the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem de-
livers an affine function u : X → R that represents the restriction of ¼ to X . Such function is
non-constant if axiom 6 also holds.
Next, we claim that, under axioms 1–3 and 6, plus 4, for every f ∈ F , there exists x f ∈ X
such that f ∼ x f . Axiom 4 implies that there exist x , y ∈ X such that x ¼ f ¼ y . If x ∼ f or
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f ∼ y , we are done. Otherwise, let U = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λx + (1− λ)y ¼ f } and L = {λ ∈ [0, 1] :
f ¼ λx + (1− λ)y }. Since x  f  y , U and L are non-empty. Moreover, if λ ∈ U and λ′ ∈
(λ, 1], then (using the representation provided by u ) λ′ ∈ U . Furthermore, suppose (λk ) is a
sequence in U , so λk x + (1−λk )y ¼ f , and λk → λ; if λx + (1−λ)y ≺ f , then Axiom 3 yields
β ∈ (0, 1) such that [β · 1+ (1−β )λ]x + (1−β )(1−λ)y = βx + (1−β )[λx + (1−λ)y ] ≺ f : but
β · 1+ (1−β )λ > λ, so there exists n such that β · 1+ (1−β )λ ≥ λk , so β · 1+ (1−β )λ ∈U and
therefore [β · 1+ (1−β )λ]x + (1−β )(1−λ)y = βx + (1−β )[λx + (1−λ)y ] ¼ f : contradiction.
Hence, λ∈U , so U is closed. Similarly the set L is closed. Since U ∪L = [0, 1], by connectedness
there must be λ∈U ∩ L, which implies the claim.
Notice now that, given a sequence ( f k ) ⊂ F and a bounded act f ∈ Fb we have f k → f as
defined before axiom 5 iff for every x , y ∈ X such that u (x ) > u (y ), there exists N such that for
n ≥N and all s ∈S,
1
2
u ( f (s ))+
1
2
u (y )<
1
2
u ( f k (s ))+
1
2
u (x ) and
1
2
u ( f k (s ))+
1
2
u (y )<
1
2
u ( f (s ))+
1
2
u (x ).
This is equivalent to the requirement that |u ( f k (s ))−u ( f (s ))| < u (x )−u (y ) for all s . In other
words, f k → f iff u ◦ f k → u ◦ f in the sup-norm topology, i.e. in B (Σ).
Therefore, under Axioms 1–4 and 6, Axiom 5 is equivalent to the following statement: given
( f k )⊂F , (x k )⊂ X and f ∈Fb , if f k ∼ x k for all k and u ◦ f k → u ◦ f in the sup-norm topology,
then u (x k )→ u (x ) [in the usual convergence in R] for some x ∈ X . Furthermore, we claim that
the axiom also implies two key properties:
Continuity onF : given ( f k )⊂F , (x k )⊂ X and f ∈F , if f k ∼ x k for all k and u ◦ f k → u ◦ f ,
then there exists x ∈X such that u (x k )→ u (x ) and f ∼ x .
Proof : To see this, consider the sequence (hk ) ⊂ F constructed by letting h2k−1 = f k and
h2k = f for k ≥ 1, and the sequence (z k ) ⊂ X such that x 2k−1 = x k and x 2k = y , where y ∈ X
satisfies f ∼ y . Then u ◦hk → u ◦ f , so Axiom 5 implies that u (z k )→ u (z ) for some z ∈ X . Now,
considering k even, it must be the case that u (y ) = u (z ), i.e. x f ∼ z ; and considering k odd, we
must have u (x ) = limk u (x k ) = u (z ), i.e. x ∼ z : thus, f ∼ y ∼ z ∼ x , as claimed. QED
Unique limits onFb : if f ∈ Fb , ( f k ), (g k ) ⊂F , (x k ), (y k ) ⊂ X , f k ∼ x k and g k ∼ y k for all k ,
and f k → f , g k → f , x k → x and y k → y for x , y ∈X , then x ∼ y .
Proof : Define h2k−1 = f k , h2k = g k , z 2k−1 = x k , z 2k = y k . Then h2k → f : for any ε > 0
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there is K1 such that k ≥ K1 implies ‖u ◦ f k − u ◦ f ‖ < ε, and K2 such that k ≥ K2 implies
‖u ◦g k−u ◦ f ‖<ε, so K =max(2K1−1, 2K2) is such that, for all k ≥ K , ‖u ◦hk−u ◦ f ‖<ε. Hence,
there is z ∈ X such that u (z k )→ u (z ). Now considering odd indices, u (x ) = limk u (x k ) = u (z ),
and considering even indices, u (y ) = limk u (y k ) = u (z ), so x ∼ y as claimed. QED
We then define I : Bb (Σ, u (X ))→R by letting I (a ) = u (x ), where a = u ◦ f for some f ∈Fb ,
and there are sequences ( f k ) ⊂ F and (x k ) ⊂ X such that f k ∼ x k for all k , f k → f , and x k →
x ∈X . By the unique limits property just established, this is well-posed, and by considering the
trivial sequences given by f k = f and x k = x ∼ f , it is clear that (I , u ) represent¼ onF as stated
in the Proposition.
The functional I is normalized: if α ∈ u (X ), then there is x ∈ X with u (x ) = α; let fα ∈F be
such that f (s ) = x for all s ∈S; Axiom 4 implies that f ∼ x , and so I (α1S) = u (x ) =α.
The functional I is monotonic on Bb (Σ, u (X )): if a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), then by standard argu-
ments there are sequences (a k ), (b k ) ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )) such that a k ≥ a for all k and a k → a in
the sup-norm, and similarly b k ≤ b for all k and b k → b . Find ( f k ), (g k ) ⊂ F , f , g ∈ Fb , and
(x k ), (y k ) ⊂ X such that a = u ◦ f , b = u ◦ g , a k = u ◦ f k , b k = u ◦ g k and f k ∼ x k , g k ∼ y k for
all k ; then f k → f and g k → g , so Axiom 5 yields x , y ∈ X with x k → x and y k → y , and there-
fore I (a ) = u (x ), I (b ) = u (y ). If now a (s ) ≥ b (s ) for all s , then a k (s ) ≥ a (s ) ≥ b (s ) ≥ b k (s )
as well, so f k (s ) ¼ g k (s ) for all s , and therefore x k ∼ f k ¼ g k ∼ y k by Axiom 4. But then
I (a ) = u (x ) = limk u (x k )≥ limk u (y k ) = u (y ) = I (b ), as required.
Finally, the functional I is continuous on Bb (Σ, u (X )). Consider a sequence (a k )⊂ Bb (Σ, u (X ))
such that a k → a ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), and find ( f k )⊂Fb and f ∈Fb such that a = u ◦ f and a k = u ◦ f k
for all k . For every k , consider a sequence (a k ,`)⊂ B0(Σ, u (X )) such that a k`→`→∞ a k , and find
acts ( f k ,`) ⊂ F such that u ◦ f k ,` = a k ,` for every `; correspondingly, find (x k ,`) ⊂ X such that
f k ,` ∼ x k ,` for every `: then Axiom 5 yields x k ∈ X such that x k ,` →`→∞ x k . Note that, by def-
inition, this means that I (a k ) = u (x k ) for every k . Now, for every k , there is `(k ) such that
‖a k ,`(k )−a k‖< 1
k
and |u (x k ,`(k ))−u (x k )|< 1
k
. Then ‖a k ,`(k )−a‖ ≤ ‖a k ,`(k )−a k‖+‖a k −a‖→ 0 as
k →∞, which implies that the sequences ( f k ,`(k ))⊂F and (x k ,`(k ))⊂ X satisfy f k ,`(k ) ∼ x k ,`(k ) for
each k and f k ,`(k ) → f . Axiom 5 then yields y ∈ X such that u (x k ,`(k ))→ u (y ); again, note that
this implies that I (a ) = u (y ). But then |u (x k )−u (y )| ≤ |u (x k )−u (x k ,`(k ))|+|u (x k ,`(k ))−u (y )| → 0,
i.e. I (a k ) = u (x k )→ u (y ) = I (a ), as required.
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Necessity: we only show that Axiom 5 holds. Consider ( f k )⊂F , (x k )⊂ X , f ∈Fb such that
f k ∼ x k for all k and f k → f . Then I (u ◦ f k )→ I (u ◦ f ) because I is continuous on Bb (Σ, u (X ));
furthermore, since f ∈ Fb , there are x , y ∈ X such that x ¼ f (s ) ¼ y for all s , and so u (x ) ≥
I (u ◦ f ) ≥ u (y ) because I is monotonic on Bb (Σ, u (X )). Since u (X ) is an interval, there exists
z ∈X such that u (z ) = I (u ◦ f ), and since u (x k ) = I (u ◦ f k ) because (I , u ) represent preferences
onF , we conclude that u (x k )→ u (z ), i.e. x k → z , as required by the Axiom.
Uniqueness: suppose that (Iu , u ) and (Iv , v ) are normalized representations of the same
preference ¼. Then, by standard arguments, v = λu +µ for some λ,µ ∈R with λ > 0. Further-
more, fix f ∈F and let x ∈X be such that f ∼ x . Then
Iv (v ◦ f ) = Iv (v (x )) = v (x ) =λu (x )+µ=λIu (u ◦ f )+µ,
which implies that the required invariance property holds on B0(Σ, u (X )). By continuity of I on
Bb (Σ, u (X )), it must hold on Bb (Σ, u (X )) as well.
Observation 2: Suppose a preference¼ is represented onF by a non-constant, affine utility
u and a normalized, monotonic, uniformly continuous functional I : B0(Σ, u (X ))→R. Then ¼
satisfies Axiom 5. To see this, note that, if ( f k )⊂F , f ∈Fb , (x k )⊂ X , f k ∼ x k and f k → f , then
(u ◦ f k ) is a Cauchy sequence in B0(Σ, u (X )) because it converges in B (Σ). By assumption, for
every ε> 0 there isδ> 0 such that a ,b ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )) and ‖a−b‖<δ imply |I (a )−I (b )|<ε. Now
fix ε> 0 and choose K such that k ,`≥ K imply ‖u ◦ f k−u ◦ f `‖<δ: then |I (u ◦ f k )−I (u ◦ f `)|<ε,
i.e. (I (u ◦ f k ))| is a Cauchy sequence in u (X ), and it converges in cl u (X ). Furthermore, by con-
tinuity of infimum and supremum, and normalization and monotonicity of I on B0(Σ, u (X )),
infs u ( f (s )) = limk infs u ( f k (s )) ≤ limk I (u ◦ f k ) ≤ limk sups u ( f k (s )) = sups u ( f (s )): but since
u ◦ f ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) by assumption, by Lemma 17 infs u ◦ f , sups u ◦ f ∈ u (X ) and therefore also
limk I (u ◦ f k )∈ u (X ), which implies the claim.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Define φ : Γ→R by φ(γ) = I (γ1S). Then φ is continuous and strictly increasing, and its inverse
φ−1 is also strictly increasing. We claim φ−1 is continuous. To see this, suppose I (γn 1S) ↑ I (γ1S)
for γ, (γn ) ∈ Γ; then by isotony (γn ) is an increasing sequence bounded above by γ, so it has a
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limit γ¯. Since φ is continuous, φ(γ¯) = limnφ(γn ) = limn I (γn 1S) = I (γ1S) = φ(γ), i.e. γ¯ = γ. A
similar argument holds for I (γn 1S) ↓ I (γ1S), and the claim follows.
The functional Iˆ : Bb (Σ,Γ)→ R defined by Iˆ (a ) = φ−1(I (a )) is normalized by construction:
Iˆ (γ1S) = φ−1(I (γ1S)) = φ−1(φ(γ)) = γ. If a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), then as required I (a ) ≥ I (b ) holds if
and only if Iˆ (a ) = φ−1(I (a )) ≥ φ−1(I (b )) = Iˆ (b ) because φ−1 is strictly increasing; in particular,
if a ≥ b then I (a )≥ I (b ) by monotonicity of I , and thus Iˆ (a )≥ Iˆ (b ) as required. Finally, since I
andφ−1 are both continuous on their respective domains, Iˆ =φ−1 ◦ I is continuous as well.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For any MBC preference ¼, the relation ¼∗ satisfies: (i) for all f , g ∈F , f ¼∗ g implies f ¼ g ; (ii)
for all x , y ∈ X , x ¼∗ y if and only if x ¼ y ; (iii) ¼∗ is reflexive, transitive, monotonic (cf. Axiom
4) and continuous: if ( f k ), (g k ) ⊂F and f , g ∈F satisfy f k ¼ g k for all k and f k → f , g k → g ,
then f ¼ g ; and (iv) ¼∗ is independent onF : for every f , g , h ∈F and λ ∈ [0, 1], f ¼∗ g implies
λ f + (1−λ)h ¼∗ λg + (1−λ)h. To see this, we argue as in the proof of Prop. 4 in GMM, with
one exception. To show that ¼∗ is monotonic, GMM invoke Certainty Independence, but only
state-by-state. Hence, Constant Independence (Axiom 2) suffices.
The result then follows from Proposition A.2 in GMM.
C.4 Unambiguous preferences on bounded acts
The Bewley-style representation in Prop. 3 is fully determined by¼, which is defined on simple
acts alone. However, just like ¼ has a unique extension ¼b toFb defined via Prop. 1 by f ¼b g
iff I (u ◦ f ) ≥ I (u ◦ g ) for all f , g ∈ Fb , so does ¼∗: one can let f ¼∗b g iff P(u ◦ f ) ≥ P(u ◦ g ) for
all P ∈C . The following result show that ¼∗b thus defined is the only possible extension of ¼∗; in
particular, if one were instead to define a preference ¼ˆ∗b using¼b as in Def. 2, one would obtain
the same binary relation.
This is important for our analysis, because our definition of relevant priors deals with simple
acts only, but we need to relate the set C to properties of the functional I on all of Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Corollary 20 Consider an MBC preference, with (I , u ) and C obtained in Propositions 1 and 3
respectively. For any two functions a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), the following statements are equivalent:
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(i) for all c ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) and λ∈ (0, 1], I (λa +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λb +(1−λ)c );
(ii) for all c ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )) and λ∈ (0, 1], I (λa +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λb +(1−λ)c );
(iii) for all P ∈C , ∫ a d P ≥ ∫ b d P .
Furthermore, C is the only weak∗ closed, convex subset of ba1(Σ) for which (i) is equivalent to
(iii) for all a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Proof: It is clear that (i) implies (ii). Now assume (ii), and by standard arguments construct
sequences (a k ), (b k )⊂ B0(Σ, u (X )) such that a k ↓ a and b k ↑ b (in the supremum norm). Then,
for all λ∈ (0, 1] and c ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )), we have
I (λa k +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λa +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λb +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λb k +(1−λ)c )
by monotonicity of I on Bb (Σ, u (X )). By Proposition 3, for each P ∈ C , P(a k ) ≥ P(b k ) for all k ,
and thus (since the sequences converge uniformly) P(a )≥ P(b ): thus, (iii) holds.
Now assume that (iii) holds. Then, for every P ∈C , λ∈ (0, 1] and c ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), P(λa +(1−
λ)c ) ≥ P(λb + (1−λ)c ); furthermore, if a ′,b ′ ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )) are such that a ′ ≥ λa + (1−λ)c and
b ′ ≤λb+(1−λ)c , then also P(a ′)≥ P(b ′) for all P ∈C , so by Proposition 3 and the fact that f ¼∗ g
implies f ¼ g , I (a ′) ≥ I (b ′). Thus, for given λ ∈ (0, 1] and c ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) construct sequences
(a k ), (b k )⊂ B0(Σ, u (X )) with a k ↓ λa + (1−λ)c and b k ↑ λb + (1−λ)c : we have I (a k )≥ I (b k ) by
the argument just given, so (i) must hold by continuity of I on Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Finally, suppose there exists another set C ′ for which (i) and (iii) are equivalent for all a ,b ∈
Bb (Σ, u (X )). The argument just given shows that (i) and (ii) are equivalent, so we can just as
well assume that C ′ is another set for which (ii) and (iii) are equivalent for all a ,b ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Define another preference ¼† on F by letting f ¼† g iff P(u ◦ f ) ≥ P(u ◦ g ) for all P ∈ C ′. But
since (ii) and (iii) are in particular equivalent for u ◦ f and u ◦ g , we must have f ¼† g iff f ¼∗ g .
It follows that u and C ′ also provide a representation of ¼∗ onF : but Proposition 3 asserts the
uniqueness of C , so C ′ =C .
C.5 Proof of Corollary 14
By Corollary 13, (ii) holds iff for all a ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )), C (a ) ≤ P(a ). The equivalence of (i) and (ii)
then follows, e.g., from Clarke (1983), Proposition 2.1.4 (b).
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C.6 Proof of Corollary 15
We first show the following preliminary result: for f ∈F , C (u ◦ f )≤ I (u ◦ f )≤ C (u ◦ f ). To see
this, let x ∈ X be such that u (x ) = C (u ◦ f ); such a prize exists because X is convex, u is affine,
and there are x ′,x ′′ ∈ X such that x ′ ¼ f (s ) ¼ x ′′, and hence u (x ′) ≥ P(u ◦ f ) ≥ u (x ′′) for every
P ∈ ba1(Σ). Hence by Prop. 3 f ¼∗ x , which, as argued in the proof of Prop. 3, implies that f ¼ x ,
i.e. I (u ◦ f )≥ u (x ) =C (u ◦ f ). The argument for C (u ◦ f ) is symmetric.
Now suppose f is crisp and let x f be its certainty equivalent. Then by definition f ∼∗ x f , i.e.
P(u ◦ f ) = u (x f ) for every P ∈C . Conversely, if C (u ◦ f ) =C (u ◦ f ), then u (x f ) = I (u ◦ f ) = P(u ◦ f )
for all P ∈C by the preceding claim, and therefore f ∼∗ x f .
C.7 Proof of Proposition 4
We show that C is the smallest set (by inclusion) that satisfies Property (i). That C satisfies that
property is clear, because Q(u ◦ f ) ≥Q(u ◦ g ) for all Q ∈ C implies f ¼∗ g by Proposition XXX,
and hence in particular f ¼ g . Now suppose another set D ⊂ ba1(Σ) also satisfies Property (i). If
Q(u ◦ f ) ≥Q(u ◦ g ) for all Q ∈ D, then, for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F , also Q(u ◦ [λ f + (1−λ)h]) ≥
Q(u ◦ [λg +(1−λ)h]) for all Q ∈D. Since D satisfies (i), this implies λ f +(1−λ)h ¼λg +(1−λ)h
for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ F : that is, f ¼∗ g . But by Prop. 3, this implies that Q(a ) ≥Q(b ) for all
Q ∈C . By Proposition A.1 in GMM, this in turn implies that C ⊂ co D, as claimed.
Next, suppose D is a weak* closed, convex subset of ba1(Σ) that satisfies Property (i), and
D 6=C ; we show that D cannot also satisfy Property (ii). As was just argued, it must be the case
that C ( D. Hence, for all f , g ∈ F such that Q(u ◦ f ) ≥ Q(u ◦ g ), we have f ¼ g because C
satisfies Property (i); therefore, D fails Property (ii).
Finally, we show that C satisfies Property (ii). Fix a weak∗ closed, convex set D ( C and
let P ∈C \D. Then, by a separation theorem (Megginson, 1998, Theorem 2.2.8 and Proposition
2.6.4), there exists d ′ ∈ B0(Σ) such that infQ∈D Q(d ′)> P(d ′). Let d = d ′−infQ∈D Q(d ′), soQ(d )≥ 0
for all Q ∈D and P(d )< 0. Now choose γ∈ int u (X ); there is ε> 0 such that γ+εd ∈ B0(Σ, u (X )).
For all Q ∈ D, Q(γ+ εd ) = γ+ εQ(d ) ≥ γ =Q(1Sγ); on the other hand, P(γ+ εd ) = γ+ εP(d ) <
γ = P(1Sγ). Take a = γ+ εd and b = 1Sγ: then Q(a ) ≥Q(b ) for all Q ∈ D, but it is not the case
that Q(a )≥Q(b ) for all Q ∈ C ⊃D, and hence, by Prop. 3, it is not the case that f ′ ¼∗ g ′, where
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f ′, g ′ ∈F are acts such that u ◦ f ′ = a and u ◦g ′ =b . By definition, there existλ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈F
such that λ f ′+(1−λ)h ≺ λg ′+(1−λ)h. Now define f = λ f ′+(1−λ)h and g = λg ′+(1−λ)h:
then f ≺ g , and for all Q ∈D, Q(u ◦ f ) = λQ(u ◦ f ′)+ (1−λ)Q(u ◦h) = λQ(a )+ (1−λ)Q(u ◦h)≥
λQ(b )+ (1−λ)Q(u ◦h) =λQ(u ◦ g ′)+ (1−λ)Q(u ◦h) =Q(u ◦ g ), as required.
C.8 Proof of Theorem 5
We first construct a pair of functionals that correspond intuitively to the “lower and upper enve-
lope” preferences of GMM. In GMM, these functionals coincide with the upper and lower Clarke
derivatives of I at 0 (i.e. at certainty). In our more general setting, a more delicate construction
is required, but the functionals in the following definition retain a central role.
Definition 9 Let Γ be an interval with int Γ 6= ;, and consider an isotone, monotonic and con-
tinuous functional I : Bb (Σ,Γ)→R. Define the functionals I0, I 0 : Bb (Σ,Γ)→R as follows
I0(a ) = sup

ξ∈ Γ : ∀λ∈ (0, 1], c ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), I (λa +(1−λ)c )≥ I (λξ+(1−λ)c )	 (7)
I 0(a ) = inf

ξ∈ Γ : ∀λ∈ (0, 1],c ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), I (λa +(1−λ)c )≤ I (λξ+(1−λ)c )	 (8)
These definitions are well-posed (a ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ) implies that there areα,β ∈ Γ such thatα≥ a (s )≥
β ; now invoke the monotonicity of I ). Furthermore:
Remark C.1 If I is as in Def. 9, then I 0(a ) ∈ Γ for all a ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ); furthermore, for all λ ∈ (0, 1]
and c ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), I (λa +(1−λ)c )≤ I (λI 0(a )+ (1−λ)c ). Similar statements hold for I0.
Proof: By definition, there is a sequence ξk ∈ Γ such that ξk ↓ I 0(a ), and for each such k we
have I (λa +(1−λ)c )≤ I (λξk +(1−λ)c ) for all λ∈ (0, 1] and c ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ). In particular, this holds
forλ= 1; since a ∈ Bb (Σ,Γ), there isα∈ Γ such thatα≤ a (s ) for all s , and this implies that ξk ≥α
for all k : if ξk < α for some k , then by isotony and monotonicity of I we would conclude that
I (ξk )< I ( 1
2
ξk + 1
2
α)≤ I (a ), contradiction. Therefore, I 0(a )≥α and so I 0(a )∈ Γ. Now continuity
of I yields the required conclusion for any λ and c .
Corollary 21 Let (I , u ) and C be as in Prop. 3. For all a ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), I0(a ) =C (a ) and I 0(a ) =
C (a ).
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Proof: Choose a ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )). Comparing the definition of I 0 to (i) in Cor. 20 shows that
I 0(a ) = inf{ξ∈ u (X ) : ∀P ∈C , P(a )≤ ξ}= inf{ξ∈ u (X ) : C (a )≤ ξ}=C (a ).
The second equality follows by noting that, if P(a )≤ ξ for all P ∈C , then also maxP∈C P(a )≤ ξ;
the converse is obvious. The third follows by noting that, once again, a ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) implies
the existence of α,β ∈ u (X ) such that α ≥ a (s ) ≥ β for all s , so that α ≥ C (a ) ≥ β : thus, C (a ) is
not only the smallest real number not smaller than C (a ), but also the smallest number in u (X )
having this property. The argument for I0 is symmetric.
Proof of Theorem 5: Recall that, by Lemma 17, e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) if and only if e ∈ B (Σ) and
infs e , sups e ∈ int u (X ). Also, per 1 in Prop. 19, ∂ I (e ) 6= ; for a dense subset of B0(Σ, u (X )).
Since I is monotonic, by Statement 4 in Prop. 19, Q ∈ ∂ I (e ) implies that Q(S)≥ 0. Moreover,
we claim that there exist e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and Q ∈ ∂ I (e ) such that Q(S)> 0. Suppose not: then
∂ I (e ) = {Q0} for all e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) such that ∂ I (e ) 6= ;, where Q0(E ) = 0 for all E ∈Σ. In this
case, choose ϑ,ϑ′ ∈ int u (X ) and ϑ > ϑ′: by the approximate Mean Value Theorem (Statement
3 in Prop. 19) applied to the constant functions 1Sϑ, 1Sϑ′ ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), there are sequences
(cn )∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and (Qn )∈ ba(Σ)with cn ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and Qn ∈ ∂ I (cn ) for each n such
that 0= lim infn Qn (ϑ1S−ϑ′1S)≥ I (ϑ1S)− I (ϑ′1S). By isotony, this implies ϑ′ ≥ ϑ, a contradiction.
Now observe that, by Proposition 1, ¼ satisfies Axioms 1–6, and so the set C is well-defined
and has the properties in Proposition 3 and Corollary 20. Let D =
⋃
e∈int Bb (Σ,u (X )) ∂ I (e ); consider
arbitrary acts f , g ∈F , and define a = u ◦ f −u ◦ g . We claim that Q(a )≥ 0 for all Q ∈D if and
only if P(a ) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ C . To prove this claim, fix ϑ ∈ int u (X ) and let δ > 0 be such that
ϑ±δa ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Suppose that Q(a ) ≥ 0 for all Q ∈ D. Fix an arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1] and d ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), and let
∆ ≡ I (λ(ϑ+δa ) + (1−λ)d )− I (λϑ+ (1−λ)d ). (Notice that if λ = 0, ∆ = 0 holds trivially.) By
the approximate Mean Value Theorem,15 there are (cn ), (Qn ) such that cn ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and
15In the notation of Statement 3 of Prop. 19, take a =λ(ϑ+δa )+ (1−λ)d and b =λϑ+(1−λ)d . We must verify
that these points lie in int Bb (Σ, u (X )). This is immediate for λϑ+(1−λ)d ; for λ(ϑ+δa )+ (1−λ)d , recall that, by
construction ϑ+δa ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), so infs (ϑ+δa ), sups (ϑ+δa ) ∈ int u (X ) by Lemma 17, and infs [λ(ϑ+δa ) +
(1−λ)d ] ≥ λ infs (ϑ+δa ) + (1−λ) infs d ∈ int u (X ); similarly, sups [λ(ϑ+δa ) + (1−λ)d ] ∈ int u (X ), so the claim
follows again by Lemma 17.
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Qn ∈ ∂ I (cn ) for each n and lim infn Qn (λϑ+(1−λ)d −λ(ϑ+δa )− (1−λ)d )≥−∆. But
Qn (λϑ+(1−λ)d −λ(ϑ+δa )− (1−λ)d ) =Qn (−λδa ) =−λδQn (a )≤ 0
by assumption, and so∆≥ 0. Since λ and d were arbitrary, this implies that I0(ϑ+δa )≥ ϑ, so it
follows by Corollary 21 that C (ϑ+δa ) = ϑ+δC (a )≥ ϑ, implying P(a )≥ 0 for all P ∈C .
Conversely, suppose that P(a )≥ 0 for all P ∈C , so I 0(ϑ−δa ) =C (ϑ−δa ) = ϑ+δC (−a )≤ ϑ.
Fix e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) such that ∂ I (e ) 6= ;. By the definition of I CR,
I CR(e ;−δa ) = lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b−(−δa )‖<ε
I (d + t b )− I (d )
t
=
= lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I ((1− t )d + t b )− I ((1− t )d )
t
=
= lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I
 
(1− t )d + t (b +δa −ϑ)+ t (ϑ−δa )− I ((1− t )d )
t
=
= lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I

(1− t )[d + t
1−t (b +δa −ϑ)]+ t (ϑ−δa )
− I ((1− t )d )
t
≤
≤ lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I

(1− t )[d + t
1−t (b +δa −ϑ)]+ t I 0(ϑ−δa )
− I ((1− t )d )
t
≤
≤ lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I

(1− t )[d + t
1−t (b +δa −ϑ)]+ t ϑ
− I ((1− t )d )
t
=
= lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b+δa‖<ε
I ((1− t )d + t (b +δa ))− I ((1− t )d )
t
=
= lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b ′:‖b ′‖<ε
I (d + t b ′)− I (d )
t
= I CR(e ; 0).
The first inequality follows from Remark C.1, after observing that, if e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), so is
d eventually, and therefore, given any choice of ε, if t is small enough we have d + t
1−t (b +
δa − ϑ) ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )). The second inequality follows from monotonicity of I and the fact
that, as we showed above, I 0(ϑ− δa ) ≤ ϑ. By Statement 2 in Prop. 19, we conclude that 0 =
supQ∈∂ I (e )Q(0) = I CR(e ; 0) ≥ I CR(e ;−δa ) = supQ∈∂ I (e )Q(−δa ); in other words, for all Q ∈ ∂ I (e ),
δQ(−a ) =Q(−δa )≤ 0, or Q(a )≥ 0. Since e was arbitrary, Q(a )≥ 0 for all Q ∈D.
The set in the right-hand side of the displayed equation in the statement, denoted C ′, is the
convex closure of the set of non-zero measures in D, normalized by dividing each Q by Q(S);
it is non-empty by the assumptions made. Since f and g were arbitrary, we have shown the
following: for all f , g ∈F , P(u ◦ f )≥ P(u ◦ g ) for all P ∈C iff P(u ◦ f −u ◦ g )≥ 0 for all P ∈C iff
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Q(u ◦ f −u ◦g )≥ 0 for allQ ∈D iff P(u ◦ f )≥ P(u ◦g ) for all P ∈C ′. Therefore, C =C ′ by Prop. 3.
C.9 Proof of the results in Sec. 6.2
C.9.1 Proposition 9 (smooth ambiguity)
Begin with some preliminary observations. The set ca1(Σ), endowed with the topology induced
by Cb (S) (i.e. the “weak-convergence” topology), is a Polish space, and so µ is a regular mea-
sure. Henceforth, we letQ ≡ ca1(Σ), and whenever we refer toQ as a topological or measurable
space, we implicitly assume that it is endowed with its weak-convergence topology and, respec-
tively, with the corresponding Borel sigma-algebra.
The map Q 7→Q(d ) defined onQ is Borel measurable for every d ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )) [cf. Theorem
17.24 in Kechris (1995)], and φ is continuous, hence Borel measurable; thus, the map Q 7→
φ(Q(d )), also viewed as a function on Q, is Borel measurable. Furthermore, |Q(d )−Q(d ′)| ≤
‖d−d ′‖ for allQ ∈Q and d , d ′ ∈ Bb (Σ). Finally, sinceφ is locally Lipschitz, it satisfies a Lipschitz
condition on every compact subset of u (X ); this implies that, for every α,β ∈ int u (X ) there is
` > 0 such that |φ(γ)−φ(γ′)| ≤ `|γ−γ′|whenever γ,γ′ ∈ (α,β ).
Since φ is a strictly increasing function on a subset of R, α ∈ ∂ φ(γ) for some γ ∈ int u (X )
implies α≥ 0 by e.g. Statement 4 in Prop. 19.
This completes the preliminaries. Now fix e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), so mins e (s ), maxs e (s ) ∈
int u (X ). Our first objective is to compute ∂ I (e ). We mimic the proof of Theorem 2.7.2 in Clarke
(1983), adapting one key step to our setting.16
Choose ε> 0 such that mins e (s )−ε, maxs e (s )+ε∈ int u (X ), and let U = Bb Σ, (mins e (s )−
ε, maxs e (s ) +ε)

. Then U is open by Lemma 17, e ∈U , and for every d ∈U and Q ∈Q, Q(d ) ∈
(mins e (s )−ε, maxs e (s )+ε). Furthermore, there is `≥ 0 such that |φ(Q(d ))−φ(Q(d ′))| ≤ `|Q(d )−
Q(d ′)| for every Q ∈ T and d , d ′ ∈ U , and hence |φ(Q(d ))−φ(Q(d ′))| ≤ `‖d − d ′‖, where the
constant ` does not depend upon Q . Therefore, for d , d ′ ∈U ,
|I (d )− I (d ′)| ≤
∫
Q
|φ(Q(d ))−φ(Q(d ′))|dµ(Q)≤ `‖d −d ′‖,
16Unfortunately, we cannot invoke Clarke’s result directly, unless S is finite or supp(µ) is countable.
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i.e. I is Lipschitz on U ; thus, the CR differential ∂ I (e ) is actually a Clarke differential.
Temporarily denote by Λ(e ) the class of measurable maps λ : Q 7→ R such that λ(Q) ∈
∂ φ(Q(e )) for µ-almost all Q ∈Q. We first show that
∂ I (e )⊂
¨∫
Q
λ(Q)Q dµ(Q) : λ∈Λ(e )
«
, (9)
where the integrals inside the braces denote the linear functional a 7→ ∫Q λ(Q)Q(a )dµ defined
for all a ∈ B (Σ). To do so, fix L ∈ ∂ I (e ). By definition, for all a ∈ B (Σ), L(a ) ≤ I c (e ; a ). The
assumptions on S, µ andφ imply Clarke’s Hypotheses 2.7.1, and in particular allow us to invoke
Fatou’s lemma and conclude that, for any fixed a ∈ B (Σ),
L(a ) ≤ I c (e ; a ) = lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
∫
Q
φ(Q(d + t a ))−φ(Q(d ))
t
dµ(Q)≤
≤
∫
Q
lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
φ(Q(d + t a ))−φ(Q(d ))
t
dµ(Q) =
=
∫
Q
(φ ◦Q)c (e ; a )dµ(Q) =
∫
Q
max
M∈∂ (φ◦Q)(e )M (a )dµ(Q).
We now follow the strategy of Clarke’s “alternate proof sketch” on pp. 77-78, rather than his
main proof. However, the key step in Clarke’s sketch involves applying a measurable selection
theorem to the correspondence Q 7→ ∂ (φ ◦Q)(e ); this requires assumptions that need not hold
in our setting. Thus, we exploit the special structure of the functional I instead.
If φ is regular, then for every d ∈ U and Q ∈ Q, ∂ (φ ◦Q)(d )) = {λQ : λ ∈ ∂ φ(Q(d ))} by
Theorem 2.3.9 part (iii) in Clarke (1983), and φ ◦Q is also regular. If −φ is regular, we apply the
cited result to the map d 7→ ((−φ) ◦Q)(d ) = −(φ ◦Q)(d ), concluding that −φ ◦Q is regular and
∂ (−φ ◦Q)(d ) = {λQ : λ ∈ ∂ (−φ)(Q(d ))}; but ∂ (−φ)(γ) =−∂ φ(γ) and ∂ (−φ ◦Q) =−∂ (φ ◦Q) by
Prop. 2.3.1 in Clarke (1983), so again ∂ (φ ◦Q)(d ) =−∂ (−φ ◦Q)(d ) = {−λQ : λ∈ ∂ (−φ)(Q(d ))}=
{−λQ : λ∈−∂ φ(Q(d ))}= {λ′Q : λ′ ∈ ∂ φ(Q(d ))}. Hence, in either case, we can write
L(a )≤
∫
Q
max
λQ∈∂ φ(Q(e ))
λQQ(a )dµ(Q).
We now apply a measurable maximum theorem. By Proposition 2.1.5 (d) in Clarke (1983),
the map γ 7→ ∂ φ(γ) is upper hemicontinuous; hence, the lower inverse (Aliprantis and Border,
2007, p.557) of every closed set is closed (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Lemma 17.4), so ∂ φ is
measurable (hence also weakly measurable) in the sense of Def. 18.1 of Aliprantis and Border
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(2007) (see also Lemma 18.2 therein). Now consider an open subset V of R: since ∂ φ is weakly
measurable, the set V ′ = {γ : ∂ φ(γ)∩U 6= ;} is Borel in R; since, as noted above, the evaluation
map Q 7→ Q(e ) is Borel measurable on Q, the preimage of V ′, i.e. {Q : Q(e ) ∈ {γ : ∂ φ(γ) ∩
V 6= ;}} = {Q : ∂ φ(Q(e ))∩V 6= ;} is Borel in Q. Therefore, the correspondence Q 7→ ∂ φ(Q(e )),
defined on the measurable space Q and taking values in the (separable metric) space R, is
weakly measurable. Finally, the map (Q ,λ) 7→ λQ(a ) is a Caratheodory function: that is, for
every λ ∈ R the map Q 7→ λQ(a ) is Borel-measurable, because it is a constant multiple of an
evaluation function on Q, and for every Q ∈ Q, the map λ 7→ λQ(a ) is continuous. Finally,
Q 7→ ∂ φ(Q(e )) takes values in a separable metric space, has non-empty compact values, and
is weakly measurable. Then, by Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2007), there exists
a measurable selection from the argmax correspondence, i.e. a map λa ∈ Λ(e ) such that, for
every Q ∈Q, λa (Q)Q(a ) =maxλ∈∂ φ(Q(e ))λQ(a ).
We conclude that, for every a ∈ B (Σ), we can write
L(a )≤ max
λ∈Λ(e )
∫
Q
λ(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q).
We now go back to Clarke’s proof sketch, and merely adapt his notation and fill in details that
Clarke omits. Since in particular equality obtains in case a = 0, we can rewrite this as
min
a∈B (Σ)maxλ∈Λ(e )
¨∫
Q
λ(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q)− L(a )
«
= 0.
The next step entails applying a “lop-sided minmax theorem” (Aubin, 2000, Theorem 2.7.1); we
now verify that the required assumptions hold (cf. Clarke, 1977, proof of Lemma 2). First, the
sets B (Σ) and Λ(e ) are convex; for the latter, this follows from the fact that each ∂ φ(γ) is it-
self convex. Second, Λ(e ) is a weak-compact subset of L1(µ). To see this, note first that, as was
shown above,φ satisfies a Lipschitz condition with Lipschitz constant `on [mins e (s ), maxs e (s )];
by Remark 5.2.1 in ACL, this implies that |λ| ≤ ` for all γ∈ [mins e (s ), maxs e (s )] andλ∈ ∂ φ(γ); in
particular, if λ ∈Λ(e ), then |λ(Q)| ≤ ` for µ-almost all Q ∈Q. Hence, Λ(e )⊂ L1(µ). Furthermore,
if (λk )∈Λ(e ) converges to some λ∈ L1(µ) in the L1(µ) norm, then some subsequence converges
pointwise (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Theorem 13.6), and this implies that λ(Q) ∈ ∂ φ(Q(e ))
µ-a.e. because ∂ φ(Q(e )) is closed. Thus, Λ(e ) is norm-closed, and hence (because it is convex)
also weak-closed (e.g. Dunford and Schwartz, 1957, V.3.13). Finally, since |λ(Q)| ≤ ` < ∞ for
45
all λ ∈ Λ(e ) and µ-almost all Q ∈ Q, the Dunford-Pettis criterion (e.g. Dunford and Schwartz,
1957, Theorem IV.8.9) implies that Λ(e ) is weakly sequentially compact; finally, since it is also
weak closed, it is weak compact by the Eberlein-Smulian theorem, as required (e.g. Dunford and
Schwartz, 1957, Theorem V.6.1). The above arguments imply that Λ(e ) is non-empty. Lastly, the
function (a ,λ) 7→ ∫Q λ(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q)−L(a ) defined on B (Σ)×Λ(e ) is clearly linear in a for every
λ ∈Λ(e ), and weakly continuous in λ for every a ∈ B (Σ), because the evaluation map Q 7→Q(a )
is bounded [in the sense that Q(a )∈ [mins a (s ), maxs a (s )] for all Q] and thus defines a continu-
ous linear functional λ 7→ ∫Q λ(Q)Q(a )dµ on L1(µ) and hence Λ(e ). The cited theorem by Aubin
then yields λ∗ ∈Λ(e ) such that
min
a∈B (Σ)
¨∫
Q
λ∗(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q)− L(a )
«
= 0.
But then it cannot be the case that the quantity in braces is strictly positive for some function
a : otherwise, it would be strictly negative for −a . Hence, we conclude that
∀a ∈ B (Σ), L(a ) =
∫
Q
λ∗(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q),
which states that every L ∈ ∂ I (e ) has the required representation. Hence, Eq. (9) holds. Observe
that, sinceλ∗(Q)∈ ∂ φ(Q(e )) forµ-almost allQ ,λ∗(Q)> 0 for suchQ , which implies that L(1S)> 0
for every L ∈ ∂ I (e ).
The “final steps” of Clarke’s proof (p. 79) apply almost verbatim. If φ is regular, we noted
above that, by our assumptions, the map d 7→ φ ◦Q is regular for every Q ∈ Q; Clarke’s argu-
ment then applies to show that I ′(e ; a ) =
∫
Q(φ ◦Q)′(e ; a )dµ(Q) for all a ∈ B (Σ), and that I is
itself regular. Then, if L =
∫
Q λ(Q)Q dµ(Q) for some λ∈Λ(e ), then by definition λ(Q)∈ ∂ φ(Q(e ))
for µ-almost all Q , and so I 0(e ; a ) = I ′(e ; a ) =
∫
Q(φ ◦Q)′(e ; a )dµ(Q) =
∫
Q(φ ◦Q)◦(e ; a )dµ(Q) =∫
Qmaxλ∈∂ φ(Q(e ))λQ(a )dµ(Q) ≥
∫
Q λ(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q) = L(a ), where the first and third equalities
follow by regularity, so L ∈ ∂ I (e ). If instead −φ is regular, then d 7→ −φ ◦Q is regular for ev-
ery Q ∈ Q, and since (−I )(d ) = ∫Q(−φ ◦Q)(d )dµ(Q), we conclude that (−I )′(e ; a ) = ∫Q(−φ ◦
Q)′(e ; a )dµ(Q), and −I is regular. Then, if λ(Q) ∈ Λ(e ) and L are as above, −λ(Q) ∈ ∂ (−φ(Q(e ))
forµ-almost allQ , and so (−I )0(e ; a ) = (−I )′(e ; a ) = ∫Q(−φ◦Q)′(e ; a )dµ(Q) = ∫Q(−φ◦Q)◦(e ; a )dµ(Q) =∫
Qmaxλ∈∂ (−φ(Q(e )))λQ(a )dµ(Q) ≥
∫
Q−λ(Q)Q(a )dµ(Q) = −L(a ). Thus, −L ∈ ∂ (−I )(e ), so L ∈
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∂ I (e ). Thus, finally,
∂ I (e ) =
(∫
ca1(Σ)
λ(Q) ·Q dµ(Q) : λ∈Λ(e )
)
. (10)
Now apply Theorem 5 to obtain the result.
C.9.2 Remark 6.1 (nice preferences)
We first propose a simple sufficient condition that implies that the MBC representation un-
der consideration is nice. Say that an MBC representation (I , u ) is very nice if, for all a ∈
int Bb (Σ, u (X )), there exist t¯ > 0, η > 0 and ρ > 0 such that, for all b ∈ Bb (Σ), the conditions
‖a −b‖<η and t ∈ (0, t¯ ) imply b ,b −1St ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and I (b − t 1S)≤ I (b )−ρt .
The following result contains key facts about nice and very nice MBC representations.
Lemma 22 If an MBC representation (I , u ) is very nice, it is nice. Furthermore, ∂ (−I )(e ) =
−∂ I (e ) for every e ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), so if (I , u ) is nice, then Q0 6∈ ∂ (−I )(e ); also,
∀ε> 0, ∃e+ ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) s.t. ‖e − e+‖<ε and I (e+)> I (e ). (11)
Proof: By definition,
I CR(e ;−1S) = lim
ε↓0 lim supd→e ,t ↓0
inf
b :‖b−(−1S )‖<ε
I (d + t b )− I (d )
t
≤
≤ lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
I (d − t 1S)− I (d )
t
≤
≤ lim sup
d→e ,t ↓0
I (d )− tρ− I (d )
t
=−ρ < 0,
where the second inequality follows because, as soon as d is sufficiently close to e and t is
sufficiently small, a suitable ρ > 0 can be found. Since I CR(e ;−1S) = supQ∈∂ I (e )Q(−1S), the zero
measure cannot belong to ∂ I (e ).
For the remaining claims, since I is monotonic, by Theorem 1 part (d) in Rockafellar (1979),
I is directionally Lipschitz, and thus (cf. p. 333 therein) ∂ (−I )(e ) = −∂ I (e ). In particular,
Q0 6∈ ∂ (−I )(e ), as claimed. Finally, for Eq. (11), Eqs. (1.5) and (1.7) in Rockafellar (1979), applied
to−I , imply that, sinceQ0 6∈ ∂ (−I )(e ), there exists a ∈ B (Σ) andρ > 0 such that, in particular, for
every η> 0 there exists λη > 0 such that, for every t ∈ (0,λη) there is a ′t ∈ B (Σ)with ‖a ′t −a‖<η
and (−I )(e + t a ′t )≤ (−I )(e )− tρ, or equivalently I (e + t a ′t )≥ I (e ) + tρ > I (e ). For given ε > 0,
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choose η> 0 and µ> 0 such that ‖e +t a ′‖ ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and ‖(e +t a ′)−e ‖= ‖t a ′‖<ε for all
t ∈ (0,µ) and a ′ ∈ B (Σ)with ‖a ′−a‖<η, then choose t ∈ (0, min(λη,µ)) and define e+ = e +t a ′t ,
where a ′t is the function whose existence is implied by Rockafellar’s result.
Now turn to the proof of Remark 6.1. Variational preferences are characterized by G (γ,Q) =
γ+ c (Q), and the infimum is always attained; furthermore, they are translation-invariant. This
implies that they are uniformly continuous on B0(Σ, u (X )), and hence satisfy Axiom 5, as shown
in the proof of Proposition 1. Furthermore, I (b−t 1S) = I (b )−t whenever b ,b−t 1S ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )).
Thus, (I , u ) is very nice, with ρ = 1 and arbitrary t¯ and η.
CF preferences are characterized by G (γ,Q) = γ
ϕ(Q) , withϕ(Q)∈ (0, 1], and again the infimum
is always attained. Furthermore, the CF functional is Lipschitz continuous (Chateauneuf and
Faro, 2006, Lemma 22), and hence satisfies Axiom 5. Finally, if b ,b − t 1S ∈ Bb (Σ, u (X )), letting
Qb ∈ arg minQ∈ba1(Σ) Q(b )ϕ(Q) ,
I (b − t 1S)≤Qb (b − t 1S)
ϕ(Qb )
= I (b )− t
ϕ(Qb )
≤ I (b )− t ,
so again (I , u ) is very nice.
Smooth ambiguity preferences extend to all of Bb (Σ, u (X )), as we argued in §6.2.2, and hence
are MBC preferences. Furthermore, the assumptions on µ and u ensures that, by Theorem 16
in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008), a UA representation exists; furthermore, since u (X ) = R, the
infimum in Eq. (6) is attained. Next, recall that, if φ is concave, it has a finite and weakly
decreasing right derivative φ′− in the interior of its domain u (X ). By concavity, φ(γ − t ) ≤
φ(γ)−tφ′−(γ)whenever γ,γ−t ∈ int u (X ). Hence, for a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) and for any η> 0, t¯ > 0
such that ‖b − a‖ ≤ η and t ∈ (0, t¯ ) imply b ,b − 1St ∈ int B0(Σ, u (X )), ∫ φ(Q(b − t 1S))dµ(Q) ≤∫
φ(Q(b ))dµ(Q)−ρt , where ρ = φ′−(infs a −η);17 this choice of ρ ensures that −φ′−(Q(b ))t ≤
−ρt whenever ‖a −b‖<η. Thus, (I , u ) is a very nice, hence nice MBC representation.
17Note that, if η> 0 is such that ‖b−a‖ ≤η (the weak inequality is important) implies b ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), then in
particular this is true for b = a −1Sη, which implies that infs a −η∈ int u (X ) by Lemma 17; thus, ρ is well-defined.
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C.9.3 Proposition 12 (UA)
Denote by D the set in parentheses in the statement. To see that C ⊂ co D, fix f , g ∈ F and
suppose Q(u ◦ f )≥Q(u ◦g ) for all Q ∈D. Then, for allλ∈ (0, 1) and h ∈F , Q(u ◦[λ f +(1−λ)h])≥
Q(u ◦ [λg + (1− λ)h]). Let Q f ∈ arg minQ∈ba1(Σ)Q(u ◦ [λ f + (1− λ)h]) ≥ Q(u ◦ [λg + (1− λ)h]):
then I (u ◦ [λ f + (1− λ)h]) = G (Q f (u ◦ [λ f + (1− λ)h],Q f ) ≥ G (Q f (u ◦ [λg + (1− λ)h]),Q f ) ≥
minQ∈ba1(Σ)G (Q(u ◦ [λg +(1−λ)h]),Q) = I (u ◦ [λ f +(1−λ)h]), i.e. λ f +(1−λ)h ¼λg +(1−λ)h.
Thus, by definition, f ¼∗ g , and Proposition A.1 in GMM implies that C ⊂ co D.
For the opposite inclusion, fix a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) such that ∂ I (a ) 6= ;, and let Sa = {b ∈
Bb (Σ, u (X )) : I (b )≥ I (a )}. Since I is quasiconcave, Sa is convex. By Lemma 22, Q0 6∈ ∂ (−I )(a ) =
−∂ I (a ), and Sa = {b :−I (b )≤−I (a )} is the sublevel set of −I at a . By Theorem 5 in Rockafellar
(1979), the (Clarke) normal cone to Sa at a is contained in
⋃
λ≥0λ∂ (−I )(a ); since Sa is convex,
its normal cone coincides with the set N (a ) = {Q ∈ ba(Σ) :∀b ∈Sa , Q(a )≥Q(b )}: cf. Rockafellar
(1980), Theorem 1 and §7. Using the noted fact that ∂ (−I ) =−∂ I , we obtain
{Q ∈ ba(Σ) :∀b ∈Sa , Q(b )≥Q(a )} ⊂
⋃
λ≥0
λ∂ I (a ). (12)
We now show that
arg min
Q ′∈ba1(Σ)
G (Q ′(a ),Q ′)⊂ {Q ∈ ba(Σ) :∀b ∈Sa , Q(b )≥Q(a )} (13)
Fix Q ∈ arg minQ ′∈ba1(Σ)G (Q ′(a ),Q ′) and consider first b ∈Sa such that I (b )> I (a ): then
G (Q(b ),Q)≥ arg min
Q ′∈ba1(Σ)
G (Q ′(b ),Q ′) = I (b )> I (a ) =G (Q(a ),Q).
Since G is non-decreasing in its first argument, Q(b )>Q(a ). Next, consider an arbitrary b ∈ Sa
such that I (b )≥ I (a ). Since a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), the property in Eq. (11) yields a+ ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X ))
such that I (a+) > I (a ). Next, for n ≥ 1, let bn = 1n a+ + n−1n b . Since I is quasiconcave, I (bn ) ≥
min(I (a+), I (b )) ≥ I (a ); furthermore, by construction bn ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )). We then invoke
Eq. (11) again to obtain b+n ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )) such that ‖b+n − bn‖ < 1n and I (b+n ) > I (bn ), so
I (b+n )> I (a ), and therefore Q(b
+
n )>Q(a ) by the preceding argument. But ‖b+n −b‖ ≤ ‖b+n −bn‖+
‖bn −b‖ ≤ 1n + 1n ‖a+−b‖→ 0, so Q(b ) = limn Q(b+n )≥Q(a ).
We thus conclude that Eq. (13) holds, so that in light of Eq. (12) we obtain
arg min
Q ′∈ba1(Σ)
G (Q ′(a ),Q ′)⊂⋃
λ≥0
λ∂ I (a ).
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Clearly, Q ∈ arg minQ ′∈ba1(Σ)G (Q ′(a ),Q) satisfies Q(S) = 1; since, by Statement 4 in Prop. 19,
Q ′(S) ≥ 0 for all Q ′ ∈ ∂ I (a ), and Q0 6∈ ∂ I (a ), Q = λQ ′ for λ = 1/Q ′(S) and Q ′ ∈ ∂ I (a ), i.e.
Q =Q ′/Q ′(S) for some non-zero Q ′ ∈ ∂ I (a ). Now Theorem 5 implies that Q ∈C . Since a and Q
were arbitrary, D ⊂C .
C.9.4 Proposition 10
Denote by H : Bb (Σ, u (X ))→ Rn the map defined by Hi (a ) = P(ζi a ) for 0 ≤ i < n and Hn (a ) =
P(a ); also, let W˜ : E (P,ζ)× u (X ) → R be defined by W˜ (ϕ,γ) = γ+ A(ϕ) for all γ ∈ u (X ) and
ϕ ∈ E (P,ζ). Then I = W˜ ◦H , ∂Hi = {M i } for 0 ≤ i < n , ∂Hn = {P}. If the function A is regular,
then W˜ is regular, and furthermore ∂ W˜ /∂ γ = {1}; thus, by Clarke (1983, Corollary 1 to Prop.
2.3.3 and Thm. 2.3.9 part (iii)),
∂ I (a ) =
(
P +
∑
0≤i<n
αi M i : (αi )0≤i<n ∈ ∂ A(H0(a ), . . . , Hn−1(a ))
)
,
for every a ∈ int Bb (Σ, u (X )), and the result now follows from Theorem 5. If instead −A is regu-
lar, then similarly ∂ (−I )(a ) = ¦P +∑0≤i<n αi M i +αn P : (αi )0≤i<n ∈ ∂ (−A(H0(a ), . . . , Hn−1(a )))©;
arguing as in the proof of Proposition 9, ∂ (−W˜ (H (a ))) = −∂ W˜ (H (a )) and ∂ (−I )(a ) = −∂ I (a ),
so the above equality obtains in this case as well.
C.9.5 Proof of Proposition 11 (mean-dispersion preferences)
Begin with a preliminary result.
Lemma 23 Let D ⊂ ba(Σ)with Q ≥ 0 for all Q ∈D, and Q(S)> 0 for at least one Q ∈D. Let
C1 ≡

Q
Q(S)
: Q ∈D,Q(S)> 0

, C2 ≡

Q
Q(S)
: Q ∈ coD,Q(S)> 0

:
then coC1 = coC2.
Proof: It is obvious that C1 ⊂ C2, so it is enough to show that C2 ⊂ coC1. Let P =∑ni=1λi QiQi (S) ,
with Q i ∈ coD and Q i (S) > 0 for each i . It is enough to consider the case Q i ∈ co D, because if
every Q i is the limit of a net (Q
j i
i ) in co D, then eventually Q
j i
i (S) > 0, and we can define a net
(P j1,...,jn ), with P j1,...,jn =
∑
i λi [Q
j i
i (S)]−1Q
j i
i , that converges to P .
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Thus, write Q i =
∑n i
j=1ρ
i
jQ
i
j for each i , where Q
i
j ∈ D. We can also assume that Q ij (S) > 0
for all i , j , because Q ij (S) = 0 and Q
i
j ≥ 0 imply Q ij = 0 and so we can simply drop it from the
summation. We have
P =
∑
i
λi
∑n i
j=1ρ
i
jQ
i
j∑n i
j=1ρ
i
jQ
i
j (S)
=
∑
i
λi
∑n i
j=1ρ
i
jQ
i
j (S)∑n i
k=1ρ
i
kQ
i
k (S)
Q ij
Q ij (S)
=
n∑
i=1
n i∑
j=1
λiρ
i
jQ
i
j (S)∑n i
k=1ρ
i
kQ
i
k (S)
Q ij
Q ij (S)
;
clearly, for each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , n i ,
λiρ
i
j Q
i
j (S)∑ni
k=1ρ
i
kQ
i
k (S)
≥ 0, and these quantities add up to 1.
Hence, P is a convex combinations of measures Q ij ∈D with Q ij (S)> 0, as required.
Proof: Let ϕˆ(µ,ρ) = ϕ(µ,−ρ), which by assumption is regular. Note that ∂ ϕˆ(e ) has non-
negative components by Lemma 19 part 4, because it is increasing in both arguments.
Next, the map a 7→ a −a ·pi1S is linear, hence strictly differentiable; the function ρˆ :Rn →R
defined by ρˆ(a ) = −ρ(a − a ·pi1S) is then the composition of a regular function and a scalar-
valued, strictly differentiable function; by (iii) in Clarke (1983, Prop. 2.3.9), it is regular, and
∂ ρˆ(e ) = {∑s αs (1{s }−pi) : α∈ ∂ (−ρ)(e − e ·pi1S)}= {∑s αs (pi−1{s }) : α∈ ∂ ρ(e − e ·pi1S)}.
Finally, let pˆi(e ) =pi·e , which is linear and hence regular, and observe that I (e ) = ϕˆ(pˆi(e ), ρˆ(e )).
By (i) in the cited Proposition, ∂ I (e ) = co{β1pi+β2∑s αs (pi−1{s }) : (β1,β2)∈ ∂ ϕ¯(pˆi(e ), ρˆ(e )), α∈
∂ ρ(e−e ·pi1S)}. Furthermore, ϕˆ(µ,ρ) =ϕ(µ,−ρ) implies that ϕˆCR(µ,ρ;µ′,ρ′) =ϕCR(µ,−ρ;µ′,−ρ′)
and hence that (β1,β2)∈ ∂ ϕˆ(µ,ρ) iff (β1,−β2)∈ ∂ ϕ(µ,−ρ). Therefore,
∂ I (e ) = co
(
β1pi+β2
∑
s
αs (1{s }−pi) : (β1,β2)∈ ∂ ϕ(e ·pi,ρ(e − e ·pi1S)), α∈ ∂ ρ(e − e ·pi1S)
)
Notice that, for every β1,β2,α as above, β1pi · 1S +β2∑s αs (1{s }−pi) · 1S = β1. The result now
follows from Theorem 5 and Lemma 23.
References
Charalambos Aliprantis and Kim Border. Infinite Dimensional Analysis. Springer Verlag, Berlin,
2007.
Frank J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann. A definition of subjective probability. Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 34:199–205, 1963.
51
Jean-Pierre Aubin. Applied Functional Analysis. Wiley-Interscience, 2000.
Didier Aussel, Jean-Noël Corvellec, and Marc Lassonde. Mean value property and subdifferen-
tial criteria for lower semicontinuous functions. Transactions of the American Mathematical
Society, 347:4147–4161, 1995.
Aurélien Baillon, Olivier L’Haridon, and Laetitia Placido. Machina’s collateral falsifications of
models of ambiguity attitude. Mimeo, 2008.
Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzak Gilboa, and Jean-Marc Tallon. Sharing beliefs: Between
agreeing and disagreeing. Econometrica, 68:685–694, 2000.
Nicolas Bourbaki. General Topology. Springer Verlag, 1998.
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Luigi Montrucchio. Un-
certainty averse preferences. Carlo Alberto Notebook 77, 2008.
Alain Chateauneuf and Josè Heleno Faro. Ambiguity through confidence functions. Mimeo,
2006.
Alain Chateauneuf and Jean-Marc Tallon. Diversification, convex preferences and non-empty
core in the Choquet expected utility model. Economic Theory, 19:509–523, 2002.
Frank H. Clarke. Multiple integrals of Lipschitz functions in the calculus of variations. Proceed-
ings of the American Mathematical Society, 64:260–264, 1977.
Frank H. Clarke. Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis. J. Wiley, New York, 1983.
Arthur P. Dempster. Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multi-valued mapping. Annals
of Mathematical Statistics, 38:325–339, 1967.
Nelson Dunford and Jacob T. Schwartz. Linear Operators, Part I. Wiley Interscience, New York,
1957.
Daniel Ellsberg. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75:
643–669, 1961.
52
Larry G. Epstein. A definition of uncertainty aversion. Review of Economic Studies, 66:579–608,
1999.
Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci. Ambiguity made precise: A comparative foundation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 102:251–289, 2002.
Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, and Massimo Marinacci. Differentiating ambiguity and
ambiguity attitude. Journal of Economic Theory, 118:133–173, 2004.
Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, and Massimo Marinacci. Revealed ambiguity and its con-
sequences: Unambiguous acts and events. Mimeo, 2005.
Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 18:141–153, 1989.
Itzhak Gilboa, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and David Schmeidler. Objective and
subjective rationality in a multiple prior model. Econometrica, forthcoming.
Simon Grant and Benjamin Polak. Generalized variational preferences. Mimeo, 2007.
Harvey J. Greenberg and William P. Pierskalla. Quasiconjugate function and surrogate duality.
Cahiers du Centre d’Etude de Recherche Operationelle, 15:437–448, 1973.
Lars P. Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent. Robust control and model uncertainty. The American
Economic Review, 91:60–66, 2001.
Lars P. Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent. Robustness. Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ,
2008.
Lars P. Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent, and Thomas D. Tallarini. Robust permanent income and
pricing. Review of Economic Studies, 66:873–907, 1999.
Chip Heath and Amos Tversky. Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice
under uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4:5–28, 1991.
Robin M. Hogarth and Hillel J. Einhorn. Venture theory: A model of decision weights. Manage-
ment Science, 36:780–803, 1990.
53
Alexander Kechris. Classical Descriptive Set Theory. New York, Springer-Verlag, 1995.
Peter Klibanoff, Massimo Marinacci, and Sujoy Mukerji. A smooth model of decision making
under ambiguity. Econometrica, 73:1849–1892, 2005.
Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Aldo Rustichini. Ambiguity aversion, robustness,
and the variational representation of preferences. Econometrica, 74:1447–1498, 2006.
Mark J. Machina. Risk, ambiguity, and the rank-dependence axioms. American Economic Re-
view, 99:385–392, 2009.
Mark J. Machina and David Schmeidler. A more robust definition of subjective probability.
Econometrica, 60:745–780, 1992.
Robert E. Megginson. An Introduction to Banach Space Theory. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
Klaus Nehring. Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: A precarious coexistence. Mathemathical
Social Sciences, 38:197–213, 1999.
Klaus Nehring. Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambigu-
ity. Mimeo, November 2002.
Klaus Nehring. Bernoulli without Bayes: A theory of utility-sophisticated preferences under
ambiguity. Mimeo, 2007.
R. Tyrrell Rockafellar. Directionally Lipschitzian functions and subdifferential calculus. Pro-
ceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 39:331–355, 1979.
R. Tyrrell Rockafellar. Generalized directional derivatives and subgradients of nonconvex func-
tions. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, XXXII:257–280, 1980.
David Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity. Econometrica,
57:571–587, 1989.
Marciano Siniscalchi. A behavioral characterization of plausible priors. Journal of Economic
Theory, 128:91–135, 2006.
54
Marciano Siniscalchi. Vector expected utility and attitudes toward variation. Mimeo, 2007.
Marciano Siniscalchi. Machina’s Reflection example and VEU preferences: a very short note.
Mimeo, 2008.
Marciano Siniscalchi. Vector expected utility and attitudes toward variation. Econometrica, 77:
801–855, 2009.
Cedric A. B. Smith. Consistency in statistical inference and decision. Journal of the Royal Statis-
tical Society, Series B, 23:1–25, 1961.
Jiankang Zhang. Subjective ambiguity, probability and capacity. Economic Theory, 20:159–181,
2002.
55
